Re: [TLS] Rizzo claims implementation attach, should be interesting

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Wed, 21 September 2011 02:23 UTC

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Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2011 21:26:12 -0500
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: mrex@sap.com
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Rizzo claims implementation attach, should be interesting
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On Tue, Sep 20, 2011 at 7:10 PM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>; wrote:
> Nico Williams wrote:
>> Martin Rex wrote:
>> Undocumented design limitations are not obvious, even if in retrospect
>> they should have been.
>
> You seem to be approaching the issue from the wrong end.

As if I was at fault.  Or as if saying any of this could undo what happened.

Did SSLv2, v3, TLS 1.0, say anything that would have caused others to
realize that it was not a good choice of technology for IMAP, or to
notice that JavaScript in browsers was a recipe for disaster?  RFC2246
doesn't say anything about this: section F outlines the threat model
and says nothing about carrying untrusted content, but that's hardly
dispositive.

Nico
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