Re: [TLS] Mail regarding draft-ietf-tls-esni

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Mon, 26 November 2018 22:43 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 14:43:01 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Mail regarding draft-ietf-tls-esni
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On Mon, Nov 26, 2018 at 1:36 PM Nick Lamb <njl@tlrmx.org>; wrote:

> In section 7.1 the -02 draft says:
>
>    Clearly, DNSSEC (if the client validates and hard fails) is a defense
>    against this form of attack, but DoH/DPRIVE are also defenses against
>    DNS attacks by attackers on the local network, which is a common case
>    where SNI.
>
> Where SNI what?
>

https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/commit/1ed8d7d02c3b0884ac20c93f891d2745ab0f9d49

-Ekr



>
> I'd be tempted to just say that yes, an active adversary can force you
> to choose between privacy and connectivity, and hard fail DNSSEC is the
> only existing way to choose privacy.
>
> The current text feels more like an attempt by people who don't want to
> face the Dancing Pig problem to justify why their latest seat-belt that
> snaps in a crash (to borrow Adam Langley's phrase) is a good idea
> anyway. But regardless of whether I'm correct about that, the sentence
> is confusing as it stands now.
>
> Nick.
>
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