[TLS] Mail regarding draft-ietf-tls-esni

Nick Lamb <njl@tlrmx.org> Sun, 25 November 2018 17:19 UTC

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Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 17:18:56 +0000
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From: Nick Lamb <njl@tlrmx.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Mail regarding draft-ietf-tls-esni
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In section 7.1 the -02 draft says:

   Clearly, DNSSEC (if the client validates and hard fails) is a defense
   against this form of attack, but DoH/DPRIVE are also defenses against
   DNS attacks by attackers on the local network, which is a common case
   where SNI.

Where SNI what?

I'd be tempted to just say that yes, an active adversary can force you
to choose between privacy and connectivity, and hard fail DNSSEC is the
only existing way to choose privacy.

The current text feels more like an attempt by people who don't want to
face the Dancing Pig problem to justify why their latest seat-belt that
snaps in a crash (to borrow Adam Langley's phrase) is a good idea
anyway. But regardless of whether I'm correct about that, the sentence
is confusing as it stands now.

Nick.