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Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-encrypt-then-mac

Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com> Fri, 11 April 2014 17:24 UTC

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From: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-encrypt-then-mac
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Date: Fri, 11 Apr 2014 17:24:02 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-encrypt-then-mac
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> (We still need a 1/n-1 draft for TLS 1.0, and a RC4 die-die-die draft.

Here's an RC4 die-die-die draft: http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-popov-tls-prohibiting-rc4-01.txt

> But UTA seems to be doing that, except no one actually wants to kill
RC4)

I think a lot of people want to kill RC4. The problem is, some say: "because publishing an RC4 die-die-die RFC will not kill RC4 overnight, why bother with the RFC". IMHO, the RFC is still needed, both as a signal to the industry, and as a matter of routine maintenance of the protocol.

Cheers,

Andrei

-----Original Message-----
From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Watson Ladd
Sent: Friday, April 11, 2014 8:55 AM
To: tls@ietf.org
Subject: [TLS] draft-ietf-tls-encrypt-then-mac

Dear all,

Professor Gutman has generously cleaned up the mess left by this WG.
The draft looks good to me. Before you all go pontificate about TLS 1.3, I strongly suggest fixing TLS 1.2, and I think this draft solves one of the three problems out there.

(We still need a 1/n-1 draft for TLS 1.0, and a RC4 die-die-die draft.
But UTA seems to be doing that, except no one actually wants to kill
RC4)

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd

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