[TLS] FYI: new TLS HandshakeType allocation, from draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Fri, 30 August 2019 22:24 UTC

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Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2019 17:24:02 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: [TLS] FYI: new TLS HandshakeType allocation, from draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet
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Hi all,

New values for core types like TLS HandshakeType and ContentType don't
happen very often, so I thought people might be interested to know that
draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet (currently in IESG evaluation) is allocating
a HandshakeType, to carry key information used to encrypt SRTP media key
material.
Obviously "it's never too late to change until the RFC is published", but I
think there would need to be some pretty serious issues in order to change
it at this point, so this is expected to just be an "FYI".

-Ben