IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [TLS] Awkward Handshake: Possible mismatch of client/server view on client authentication in post-handshake mode in Revision 18

David Wong <davidwong.crypto@gmail.com> Tue, 14 February 2017 16:18 UTC

Return-Path: <davidwong.crypto@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3619A129483 for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 14 Feb 2017 08:18:39 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.599
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, HTML_MIME_NO_HTML_TAG=0.377, MIME_HTML_ONLY=0.723, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 94nZ80V8MmkF for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 14 Feb 2017 08:18:38 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-wm0-x241.google.com (mail-wm0-x241.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:400c:c09::241]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 186B3129690 for <tls@ietf.org>; Tue, 14 Feb 2017 08:18:30 -0800 (PST)
Received: by mail-wm0-x241.google.com with SMTP id r18so4306431wmd.3 for <tls@ietf.org>; Tue, 14 Feb 2017 08:18:30 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=user-agent:from:to:cc:in-reply-to:references:subject:message-id :date:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version; bh=ptjP3Jk6R7TRnCLjU+9PvGQ7pN+ZreyEQFAOMeGvLSk=; b=AoXPBfhcnWuITO28Y2tGFO/LzN7sGJ0CbmWiIGNMTye+KRC4vHDjSgATnLB54gj4si o/A4Acbps5ZMzh1TBQ4n3iAqs+vvRsNEStedx9A3NKPGj5YOM79LoUG05QAvETQ3tgK0 JXSxy929Gk3Gf2QlJILJhDYHOATDpya5wDLG0QRGovUVt0oKxLNbv63OAs+NFtn0aGs6 SiYYHfB7fIcSI39oYaOjUUBQMYF8rHqd9QJiyU0xT5oScbwuDA4OfByGJLrU4uSUGCXk A24XJsa5NaazrZyBrayJ1SpyBlQ/G2yR/jRYfQH98FeXjP/RTDnTH1x8WYrdWHxCgpjl sTbA==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:user-agent:from:to:cc:in-reply-to:references :subject:message-id:date:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version; bh=ptjP3Jk6R7TRnCLjU+9PvGQ7pN+ZreyEQFAOMeGvLSk=; b=USDfmK8NtzSSFNMMUVO2D9nvC79sMCC3C/FOmlIxfIFHc2vskxzs5c/uqhaecQc79O KZZStZhE3MpdSwvR19/dSoCSndfDhprqi8swsZODW7j5Gh+YKZiIEqM4r/vNRvgpka/Q m1rK1Smnck5mRCKiySFAtrHaEVJa5aWJqXHQu2aJxygFWhFYNlJn4sOzqgUlFabjlJu5 3lIGBgC/gxrtqhI/ZdrgdvFswUV6fFssxBwlBSJ0VdZV0vma3CLmutLWMDgcV9mCSQcE 1lMi7ktJsR6va+cTDaac7CqEHjVjyArL7Tvs9guHVECp8mRMairllBXMsvm+qCRwoqah Hf4w==
X-Gm-Message-State: AMke39ns3rz3xpF66svDgnBf7XhfoIhJcC1zpJukaqhACN0Z6RO6uKB0lDjROr6hyioMGw==
X-Received: by 10.28.86.214 with SMTP id k205mr3793424wmb.26.1487089108513; Tue, 14 Feb 2017 08:18:28 -0800 (PST)
Received: from little-david.home (LFbn-1-9943-152.w86-202.abo.wanadoo.fr. [86.202.61.152]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id s17sm1395740wrc.6.2017.02.14.08.18.27 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Tue, 14 Feb 2017 08:18:28 -0800 (PST)
Content-Type: text/html
User-Agent: NylasMailer-K2
From: David Wong <davidwong.crypto@gmail.com>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
In-Reply-To: <CAF8qwaBQOfW68BcyG_d6wNsGTT+e6XajEYd0OSjjDekEQOD2mw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CABdrxL6qupAu+Ztxw7BU1e-eoy-kfJKRQq+ZZyoKokXHNZEoZQ@mail.gmail.com> <local-bdf4ca0e-d529@nylas-mail.nylas.com> <CAF8qwaBQOfW68BcyG_d6wNsGTT+e6XajEYd0OSjjDekEQOD2mw@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <local-a70c902a-5994@nylas-mail.nylas.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2017 16:18:27 +0000
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/zBgsmNfNDLJReMgcLw4TVb7huMo>
Cc: Cas Cremers <cas.cremers@cs.ox.ac.uk>, tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Awkward Handshake: Possible mismatch of client/server view on client authentication in post-handshake mode in Revision 18
X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.17
Precedence: list
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2017 16:18:39 -0000





On Feb 14 2017, at 4:44 pm, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> wrote:
NewSessionTicket always includes in-handshake client auth. The resumption secret can't even be derived without it.



Oups, my bad. What about if the client do send a certificate, but the server decides not to accept it, but goes on with the connection (I think nothing in the spec says that the server needs to terminate the connection if the client cert is not good).

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email