Re: [TLS] Are the AEAD cipher suites a security trade-off win with TLS1.2?

Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> Wed, 16 March 2016 18:50 UTC

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Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2016 14:49:47 -0400
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To: "Paterson, Kenny" <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Are the AEAD cipher suites a security trade-off win with TLS1.2?
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On Wed, Mar 16, 2016 at 2:14 PM, Paterson, Kenny <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>;
wrote:

> Much better would be implementing an optional padding feature for the AEAD
> modes. Something like this draft proposes:
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pironti-tls-length-hiding-02


I hadn't seen that! I wonder is there an appetite here for including more
robust LH in TLS1.2 in some form? I mean a real one; as in - let's it get
it into servers and browsers sooner than TLS1.3.

-- 
Colm