Re: [Tm-rid] Draft charter

[Robert Moskowitz <[e-mail]>]

Eric

Sigh,  this is why I posted a Charter here and hoped that there would be 
comments...

HIP first of all because this is "Trustworthy Remote ID": thus HITs and 
the rest flows from that.  ASTM has lots of IDs, none are self-provable, 
that is Trustworthy.

The only IETF ID similar to HITs are the hashed Public Keys in CORE.  I 
need to find the appropriate RFCs/IDs to review and compare.

Did you really mean "Layer-2" or Layer-3?  The only other layer-2 keying 
is IKE, which does not directly have a ID like HIP.  Both IKE and HIP 
use ESP.  Diet-ESP should be preferred when we get to NetworkID and C2 
(Command and Control).  Too many different C2 tech out there to 
recommend a Layer-3 or -4 approach.

But this is it in a quick response.

More later (particularly after breakfast!).

Bob


On 10/10/19 4:21 AM, Eric Vyncke (evyncke) wrote:
>
> Bob and others,
>
> During the BoF approval call with IESG & IAB, the TM-RID BoF has been 
> approved as a non-WG-forming BoF as the charter is not completely 
> mature (see below).
>
> It was also preferred to have TM-RID as a stand-alone WG: based on 
> experience, a dedicated/focus group is lighter and more efficient. So, 
> HIP is unchanged but all work done around HIP for TM-RID will end up 
> (like now) into HIP WG.
>
> The TM-RID charter will have to be discussed in the BoF meeting in 
> Singapore and must include a privacy statement/work item. The IAB/IESG 
> feedback was also that the current charter is too much on HIP and 
> would like to explore whether other technologies (including layer-2 
> ones) could be applicable.
>
> All the above does not prevent the current work on TM-RID related 
> drafts of course.
>
> So, let’s talk in Singapore at the BoF
>
> -éric
>
> *From: *Tm-rid <[e-mail]> on behalf of Robert Moskowitz 
> <[e-mail]>
> *Date: *Friday, 4 October 2019 at 00:48
> *To: *"[e-mail]" <[e-mail]>
> *Subject: *Re: [Tm-rid] Draft charter
>
>
>
>
>
> Updated charter:
>
> Governmental agencies worldwide, including the United States Federal 
> Aviation Administration (FAA), are embarking on rule making processes 
> to define Remote Identification (RID) requirements for Unmanned 
> Aircraft Systems (UAS). ASTM International (formerly the American 
> Society for Testing and Materials) F38 Committee Work Item WK65041, 
> “Standard Specification for UAS Remote ID and Tracking”, addresses 
> such anticipated requirements. Broadcast RID defines a set of messages 
> for UAS to send one-way over Bluetooth or IEEE 802.11. Network RID 
> defines how the same information (and potentially more) can be made 
> available via the Internet. The ASTM draft does not address how to 
> ensure or at least assess trustworthiness of information communicated 
> via RID.
>
> The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Host Identity Tag (HIT) is ideally 
> suited to work within this RID effort. For each Unmanned Aircraft 
> (UA), a HIT can consolidate the 4-tuple of (UA ID, UA physical 
> location, UA onboard host ID, UA onboard host logical location [IP 
> address list]) to a 3-tuple (HIT, UA physical location, UA onboard 
> host logical location) and thereby provide significant benefits.
>
> For HIP to be used effectively in this environment, it needs updates.
>
> - Hierarchical HITs (HHIT) enabling scalable and trustable 
> registration: HHIT was part of the original design of HIP, but was 
> dropped for lack of a clear use case. RID messages containing HHITs 
> will enable use of DNS to access information about the UAS.
>
> - expanded HIP Registration for HHITs: This registration process will 
> provide proof of authenticity and prevent duplicate HHITs from 
> occurring. Further, these Registries will provide the UAS DNS 
> information and other services (including support of RVS for Network 
> RID and related applications).
>
> - new cryptographic algorithms: Extremely compact keys and signatures 
> (such as are enabled by EdDSA and Keccak functions) are needed to meet 
> the severely constrained UAS environment.
>
> Additionally, tm-rid will offer specifications for HIP-augmented ASTM 
> RID messages. Initially this will consist of additional RID 
> Authentication Messages that use the HI in public key signing 
> operations: to prove UAS ownership of the HHIT; to authenticate other 
> claims made via RID, such as position and velocity, as having been 
> made by the owner of that HHIT; and to provide observers lacking 
> current Internet connectivity with locally verifiable UAS 
> proof-of-registration objects.
>
> Further work will emerge as experience is gained in using HIP for UAS 
> RID. For example, some UAS Traffic Management (UTM) systems envision 
> using OAuth for Ground Control Systems (GCS) and authorized safety 
> personnel. HIP as an OAuth method may help in merging HIP into these 
> systems.
>
> The goal is to complete these updates to HIP by the end of 2020.
>

-- 
Standard Robert Moskowitz
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