Re: [Tm-rid] Draft charter

["Card, Stu" <[e-mail]>]

The privacy issue is debated among FAA, pilots, et al. Clearly, duly
constituted authority needs to be able to look up the operator etc. from
info provided by RID. However, the guy who just doesn't like UAS should not
be facilitated in his harassment of their legitimate operators. So while
the ID that is transmitted by/for the UA will be in plaintext for all to
read, the lookup from that to the pilot's bag of meat ID may be restricted.
Even knowing what organization is the operator is too much info: Amazon
could use it to learn Walmart delivery patterns. These registry issues are
critical & so far have been punted by ASTM (in fairness they admit openly
to having punted so far).

On Thu, Oct 10, 2019, 16:10 Eric Vyncke (evyncke) <[e-mail]> wrote:

> Bob,
>
>
>
> I hope that your breakfast was a good one ;-)
>
>
>
> More seriously, the privacy issue simply needs to be addressed by a
> document (or part of a document). If regulations say ‘no privacy’, then
> this is also a statement. But, I would believe that it is also privacy
> towards ‘normal citizens’ but again I can be wrong about the FAA rules.
> TM-RID needs a privacy consideration.
>
>
>
> Per your previous email, yes: I meant that IESG wants to ensure that HIP
> is the right solution and no other layer-2 or layer-3 techniques fit the
> requirements. So, another document to be prepared for this specific TM-RID
> use case.
>
>
>
> So, all “i” must be dotted and “t” crossed ;-)
>
>
>
> Regards
>
>
>
> -éric
>
>
>
> *From: *Tm-rid <[e-mail]> on behalf of Robert Moskowitz <
> [e-mail]>
> *Date: *Thursday, 10 October 2019 at 19:27
> *To: *Eric Vyncke <[e-mail]>, "[e-mail]" <[e-mail]>
> *Subject: *Re: [Tm-rid] Draft charter
>
>
>
> Eric,
>
> In the area of privacy, there are conflicting issues.
>
> In the USofA, NO civil UAV can have privacy of its Identity.  The FAA
> 'owns' all airspace at 1' above the ground, if I have that right (and Stu
> will correct me).  Thus according to law, a person does not have any claim
> to privacy flying a UAV over their own property.
>
> Think about it.  Just because it is on their property does not mean it is
> not interacting with others.
>
> So no privacy of ID or basic associated information.
>
> And to proper authorities more information.
>
> This is not to say that the ID is forever.  Some use cases can justify an
> ID per flight/mission.  The delivery services (read UPS, FedEX) have
> already identified and justified the need of ID per mission.  But again,
> for that delivery, the fact that the UAV belongs to delivery service Q will
> be available.
>
> NetworkID takes this farther.  It is not just the UAV in your VLOS (Visual
> Line of Sight), but also those that were there in the last 60s or MAY be
> there in the next 60s.  It could also, for authorized personnel, extend out
> further.
>
> Now when we get to C2 (Command and Control), there are some privacy
> aspects, but again the operator of a UAV (why it is called UAS for system)
> has limited privacy.  To authorized personnel the operators location MUST
> be known.  There is a Self-ID broadcast message part of the basic BT
> messages, but it is informational only (like a Realtor saying which
> property s/he is videoing for a posting).
>
> Bob
>
> On 10/10/19 4:21 AM, Eric Vyncke (evyncke) wrote:
>
> Bob and others,
>
>
>
> During the BoF approval call with IESG & IAB, the TM-RID BoF has been
> approved as a non-WG-forming BoF as the charter is not completely mature
> (see below).
>
>
>
> It was also preferred to have TM-RID as a stand-alone WG: based on
> experience, a dedicated/focus group is lighter and more efficient. So, HIP
> is unchanged but all work done around HIP for TM-RID will end up (like now)
> into HIP WG.
>
>
>
> The TM-RID charter will have to be discussed in the BoF meeting in
> Singapore and must include a privacy statement/work item. The IAB/IESG
> feedback was also that the current charter is too much on HIP and would
> like to explore whether other technologies (including layer-2 ones) could
> be applicable.
>
>
>
> All the above does not prevent the current work on TM-RID related drafts
> of course.
>
>
>
> So, let’s talk in Singapore at the BoF
>
>
>
> -éric
>
>
>
> *From: *Tm-rid <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]> on
> behalf of Robert Moskowitz <[e-mail]>
> <[e-mail]>
> *Date: *Friday, 4 October 2019 at 00:48
> *To: *"[e-mail]" <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]>
> <[e-mail]>
> *Subject: *Re: [Tm-rid] Draft charter
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Updated charter:
>
> Governmental agencies worldwide, including the United States Federal
> Aviation Administration (FAA), are embarking on rule making processes to
> define Remote Identification (RID) requirements for Unmanned Aircraft
> Systems (UAS). ASTM International (formerly the American Society for
> Testing and Materials) F38 Committee Work Item WK65041, “Standard
> Specification for UAS Remote ID and Tracking”, addresses such anticipated
> requirements. Broadcast RID defines a set of messages for UAS to send
> one-way over Bluetooth or IEEE 802.11. Network RID defines how the same
> information (and potentially more) can be made available via the Internet.
> The ASTM draft does not address how to ensure or at least assess
> trustworthiness of information communicated via RID.
>
>
>
> The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Host Identity Tag (HIT) is ideally suited
> to work within this RID effort. For each Unmanned Aircraft (UA), a HIT can
> consolidate the 4-tuple of (UA ID, UA physical location, UA onboard host
> ID, UA onboard host logical location [IP address list]) to a 3-tuple (HIT,
> UA physical location, UA onboard host logical location) and thereby provide
> significant benefits.
>
>
>
> For HIP to be used effectively in this environment, it needs updates.
>
>
>
> - Hierarchical HITs (HHIT) enabling scalable and trustable registration:
> HHIT was part of the original design of HIP, but was dropped for lack of a
> clear use case. RID messages containing HHITs will enable use of DNS to
> access information about the UAS.
>
>
>
> - expanded HIP Registration for HHITs: This registration process will
> provide proof of authenticity and prevent duplicate HHITs from occurring.
> Further, these Registries will provide the UAS DNS information and other
> services (including support of RVS for Network RID and related
> applications).
>
>
>
> - new cryptographic algorithms: Extremely compact keys and signatures
> (such as are enabled by EdDSA and Keccak functions) are needed to meet the
> severely constrained UAS environment.
>
>
>
> Additionally, tm-rid will offer specifications for HIP-augmented ASTM RID
> messages. Initially this will consist of additional RID Authentication
> Messages that use the HI in public key signing operations: to prove UAS
> ownership of the HHIT; to authenticate other claims made via RID, such as
> position and velocity, as having been made by the owner of that HHIT; and
> to provide observers lacking current Internet connectivity with locally
> verifiable UAS proof-of-registration objects.
>
>
>
> Further work will emerge as experience is gained in using HIP for UAS RID.
> For example, some UAS Traffic Management (UTM) systems envision using OAuth
> for Ground Control Systems (GCS) and authorized safety personnel. HIP as an
> OAuth method may help in merging HIP into these systems.
>
>
>
> The goal is to complete these updates to HIP by the end of 2020.
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> Robert Moskowitz
> Owner
> HTT Consulting
> C:      248-219-2059
> F:      248-968-2824
> E:      [e-mail]
>
> There's no limit to what can be accomplished if it doesn't matter who gets
> the credit
> --
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