Re: [Txauth] alternative charter writeup

"Richard Backman, Annabelle" <richanna@amazon.com> Tue, 14 January 2020 01:55 UTC

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From: "Richard Backman, Annabelle" <richanna@amazon.com>
To: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
CC: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>, "txauth@ietf.org" <txauth@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Txauth] alternative charter writeup
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Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2020 01:54:57 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Txauth] alternative charter writeup
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It’s not just about the initial communication, though. I the key thing to emphasize is the decoupling the protocol from delegation channels, which addresses the aforementioned security/complexity issues and also provides a path to support future delegation channel types without significant changes to the protocol (unlike OAuth 2.0, where extensions like Device Flow and PAR introduce substantial changes to the core protocol flow on both client and AS). Since the protocol isn’t assuming a particular front channel, it’s easier to add support for a new one.

Proposal, altered from Dick’s suggestion:
This group is chartered to develop a delegated identity and authorization protocol. The use cases supported by this protocol will include widely deployed use cases currently supported by OAuth 2.0, and OpenID Connect, an extension of OAuth 2.0. This protocol will be decoupled from delegation channels such as an end user’s web browser and operate primarily through a channel between the client and the authorization server, avoiding many of the security concerns and technical challenges of OAuth 2.0 and providing a non-invasive path for adding support for future types of clients and delegation channels.

–
Annabelle Richard Backman
AWS Identity


From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
Date: Monday, January 13, 2020 at 4:35 PM
To: "Richard Backman, Annabelle" <richanna@amazon.com>
Cc: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>, "txauth@ietf.org" <txauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Txauth] alternative charter writeup

I agree, some more "why" would help a broader audience understand the motivations. How about this change to the first paragraph?

This group is chartered to develop a delegated identity and authorization protocol. The use cases supported by this protocol will include widely deployed use cases currently supported by OAuth 2.0, and OpenID Connect, an extension of OAuth 2.0. In contrast to OAuth 2.0, where the protocol is initiated by redirecting the user's browser to an authorization server, this protocol will be initiated by the client directly interacting with the authorization server, which will mitigate many of the security concerns and technical challenges of OAuth 2.0.


On Mon, Jan 13, 2020 at 3:38 PM Richard Backman, Annabelle <richanna@amazon.com<mailto:richanna@amazon.com>> wrote:
While I agree with the goals stated in this charter, if I read this from the perspective of someone who hasn’t been our meetings or listened to Justin’s presentations, I’m hard pressed to see what the point of this group is, relative to the OAuth WG. I’d expect this charter to provide at least a cursory explanation of what problem it is trying to solve. In this case, the problem should be partially defined in relation to OAuth. What will this WG do that the OAuth WG hasn’t already done or isn’t already doing?

How about adding something like the following to paragraph 2:

The protocol will mitigate many of the security concerns and technical challenges of OAuth 2.0 by communicating over secure channels between the client and the authorization server, and minimizing the amount of information transmitted over untrusted channels.

–
Annabelle Richard Backman
AWS Identity


From: Txauth <txauth-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:txauth-bounces@ietf.org>> on behalf of Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com<mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com>>
Date: Friday, January 10, 2020 at 6:57 PM
To: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu<mailto:jricher@mit.edu>>
Cc: "txauth@ietf.org<mailto:txauth@ietf.org>" <txauth@ietf.org<mailto:txauth@ietf.org>>
Subject: Re: [Txauth] alternative charter writeup

This looks even better! Thanks Justin.

What do others think of the proposed charter now?
[https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=aZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&type=zerocontent&guid=c2542a73-9b36-42f1-b091-b07ceade18ee]ᐧ

On Fri, Jan 10, 2020 at 12:43 PM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu<mailto:jricher@mit.edu>> wrote:
Thanks, Dick. I’ve been working on an updated charter based on everyone’s feedback, and I was aiming to have out today anyway, so this timing is helpful. So here’s my take on a new charter, incorporating some of your points below:

This group is chartered to develop a delegation protocol for identity, authorization, and API access. This protocol will allow an authorizing party to delegate access to client software through an authorization server. The use cases supported by this protocol will include widely deployed use cases currently supported by OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect.

The delegation process will be acted upon by multiple parties in the protocol, each performing a specific role. The protocol will be initiated by the client interacting directly with the authorization server (in contrast with OAuth 2 which is initiated by the client redirecting the user’s browser). The client will involve the authorizing party as necessary through interaction mechanisms indicated by the protocol.

Additionally, the delegation process will allow for:

- Fine-grained specification of resource access
- Approval of identity claims and multiple resources in a single interaction
- Delegation between multiple users
- Web, mobile, single-page, and other types of client applications

The group will define extension points for this protocol to allow for flexibility in areas including:

- Cryptographic agility for keys, message signatures, and proof of possession
- User interaction mechanisms including web and non-web methods
- Mechanisms for providing user, software, organization, and other pieces of information used in authorization decisions
- Token presentation mechanisms and key bindings

Additionally, the group will provide mechanisms for management of the protocol lifecycle including:

- Discovery of the authorization server
- Revocation of active tokens
- Query of token rights by resource servers

Although the artifacts for this work are not intended or expected to be backwards-compatible with OAuth 2.0 or OpenID Connect, the group will attempt to simplify porting from OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect to the new protocol where possible.

While the initial work will focus on using HTTP for communication between the client and the authorization server, the working group will seek to take advantage of optimization features of HTTP2 and HTTP3, and will strive to enable simple mapping to other protocols such as COAP.

On Jan 10, 2020, at 12:04 PM, Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com<mailto:dick.hardt@gmail.com>> wrote:

Hey

I've written an alternative charter that I hope captures some of the feedback on Justin's charter.

I found it easier to rewrite the charter to broaden the marketplace of ideas.

Key ideas:

- This work supports existing OAuth 2.0, and OpenID Connect use cases.

- The client interacts directly with the authorization server.

/Dick

----

This group is chartered to develop a delegated identity and authorization protocol.. The use cases supported by this protocol will include widely deployed use cases currently supported by OAuth 2.0, and OpenID Connect. In contrast to OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect, where the protocol is initiated by redirecting the user's browser to an authorization server, this protocol will be initiated by the client directly interacting with the authorization server..

Additionally, the protocol will allow:
- fine-grained specification of resource access
- the user to approve requests for identity claims and access to multiple resources in one interaction
- web, mobile, single-page, and other client applications
- taking advantage of optimization features in HTTP2 and HTTP3

The group will define extension points for this protocol to allow for flexibility in areas including:

- discovery of the authorization server
- cryptographic agility for keys, message signatures, and proof of possession
- user interaction mechanisms including web and non-web methods- token presentation mechanisms and key bindings

Although the artifacts for this work are not intended or expected to be backwards-compatible with OAuth 2.0 or OpenID Connect, they will attempt to simplify porting from OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect, and strive to reuse existing semantics such as client identifiers, OAuth 2.0 scopes and access tokens, and OpenID Connect ID Tokens and claims.

While the initial work will focus on using HTTP for communication between the client and the authorization server, the working group will strive to enable simple mapping to other protocols such as COAP.


[https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=aZGljay5oYXJkdEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&type=zerocontent&guid=4100f11c-15ca-4d45-bbd2-c029965821fb]ᐧ
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