IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [Unbearable] [TokenBinding/Internet-Drafts] HTTPSTB: apply Mike Jones' feedback (#96)

=JeffH <notifications@github.com> Tue, 18 April 2017 22:51 UTC

Return-Path: <noreply@github.com>
X-Original-To: unbearable@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: unbearable@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BD75C1314BA for <unbearable@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 18 Apr 2017 15:51:30 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -8.396
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.396 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_IMAGE_ONLY_28=1.404, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-2.8, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=github.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id jlvt2B9Cd-Yi for <unbearable@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 18 Apr 2017 15:51:29 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from github-smtp2a-ext-cp1-prd.iad.github.net (github-smtp2-ext4.iad.github.net [192.30.252.195]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CFFD51314DD for <unbearable@ietf.org>; Tue, 18 Apr 2017 15:51:28 -0700 (PDT)
Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2017 15:51:28 -0700
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=github.com; s=pf2014; t=1492555888; bh=eI1jE6in2rdiDVntfeq5hBOoFOopA07rPqlIptsi/sc=; h=From:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Subject:List-ID: List-Archive:List-Post:List-Unsubscribe:From; b=y/HVrzl/NahRC5URl9zJPDxXC2REkJWrs9vQwjCSELDenxV/B6TIwI9RbYYWT3Kd8 jtdmCxMaVUZihWQs3equX5Zsu6f4+Gu/Hh+LGxNI7e5RdKoTNrLPcKHJIEUNG+vzTs HbhY1kzzblfYWsKrO69e0Z638sNt2gDaCPr0Lv18=
From: =JeffH <notifications@github.com>
Reply-To: TokenBinding/Internet-Drafts <reply+011c274f38f6d6aee2a7715436d15b5a901a3bed860c866b92cf00000001150e5a7092a169ce0cf488f1@reply.github.com>
To: TokenBinding/Internet-Drafts <Internet-Drafts@noreply.github.com>
Cc: Subscribed <subscribed@noreply.github.com>
Message-ID: <TokenBinding/Internet-Drafts/pull/96/review/33370966@github.com>
In-Reply-To: <TokenBinding/Internet-Drafts/pull/96@github.com>
References: <TokenBinding/Internet-Drafts/pull/96@github.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="--==_mimepart_58f6987014017_20b13fd5fe7f1c3c846e4"; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Precedence: list
X-GitHub-Sender: equalsJeffH
X-GitHub-Recipient: unbearable-ML
X-GitHub-Reason: subscribed
X-Auto-Response-Suppress: All
X-GitHub-Recipient-Address: unbearable@ietf.org
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/unbearable/VAvkh7hJiikyy3dkpcmY9ebUwD8>
X-Mailman-Approved-At: Tue, 18 Apr 2017 15:56:24 -0700
Subject: Re: [Unbearable] [TokenBinding/Internet-Drafts] HTTPSTB: apply Mike Jones' feedback (#96)
X-BeenThere: unbearable@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
List-Id: "\"This list is for discussion of proposals for doing better than bearer tokens \(e.g. HTTP cookies, OAuth tokens etc.\) for web applications. The specific goal is chartering a WG focused on preventing security token export and replay attacks.\"" <unbearable.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/unbearable>, <mailto:unbearable-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/unbearable/>
List-Post: <mailto:unbearable@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:unbearable-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/unbearable>, <mailto:unbearable-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2017 22:51:31 -0000

equalsJeffH commented on this pull request.



>  	assertion).</t>
 	<t>To better protect the security of the identity token, the
 	Identity Provider may wish to bind the identity token to the TLS
 	connection between the client and the Relying Party, thus
-	ensuring that only said client can use the identity token: The
-	Relying Party will compare the Token Binding ID in the identity
-	token with the Token Binding ID of the TLS connection between it
-	and the client.</t>
+	ensuring that only said client can use the identity token; the
+	Relying Party will compare the Token Binding ID (or a cryptographic 
+	hash of it) in the identity token with the Token Binding ID of the 

done, i think.

-- 
You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread.
Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub:
https://github.com/TokenBinding/Internet-Drafts/pull/96#discussion_r112082913

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email