Re: [Unbearable] HTTPS Token Binding with TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies

Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com> Mon, 17 July 2017 11:18 UTC

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From: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2017 13:18:02 +0200
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To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Cc: IETF Tokbind WG <unbearable@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Unbearable] HTTPS Token Binding with TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies
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Hey Brian,
from the CDN point of view, all backend servers are untrusted, but I
don't see any reason why CDNs shouldn't forward
Provided-Token-Binding-ID to the origin servers.

Also, Token Binding is supposed to protect Cookies (among other
things), which don't have such restriction, so this seems unnecessary.

Best regards,
Piotr Sikora

On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 12:53 PM, Brian Campbell
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com> wrote:
> To be honest, I didn't have a specific attack vector or security/privacy
> implication in mind around that. It just seemed like something that should
> generally be part of reverse proxy set up. Do you think it's too
> restrictive/perspective? Or do you know of some use-case where a reverse
> proxy wouldn't know/trust the servers that it sits in front of?
>
> On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 12:37 PM, Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
> wrote:
>>
>> Hey Brian,
>> looks good, thanks for working on that!
>>
>> One question:
>>
>> >   Reverse proxies SHOULD only add the headers to requests that are
>> >   forwarded to trusted backend servers.
>>
>> Why? What's the attack vector, security and/or privacy implications here?
>>
>> Best regards,
>> Piotr Sikora
>>
>> On Fri, Jul 14, 2017 at 6:59 PM, Brian Campbell
>> <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> wrote:
>> > Just a not-so-subtle reminder that HTTPS Token Binding with TLS
>> > Terminating
>> > Reverse Proxies is one of the agenda items for Monday's meeting in
>> > Prague
>> > and it would be great if there was some familiarity with it going into
>> > the
>> > meeting. It's relativity short as drafts go, if you're looking for
>> > something
>> > to read en route to the meeting:
>> > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-campbell-tokbind-ttrp-00
>> >
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