Re: [Uta] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-uta-smtp-require-tls-08: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Wed, 31 July 2019 23:05 UTC

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Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2019 18:05:29 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [Uta] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-uta-smtp-require-tls-08: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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On Wed, Jul 31, 2019 at 05:08:42AM -0400, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 30, 2019 at 11:16:25PM -0700, Jim Fenton wrote:
> 
> > The RFC 7672 definition of Reference Identifier includes the CN-ID, so it
> > would be more consistent to include it when referencing 6125 as well.
> 
> For the record, RFC7672 has aged a bit since ~2014 when most of it
> was written, so at some point support for CN-ID could be reconsidered.

Sure.

It doesn't really have to be this document, though -- thanks to Jim for
pointing out the RFC 7672 precedent.

> In that light, I took a look at the certificates currently live on
> MX hosts found by the DANE survey, and of 854 certificates on MX
> hosts that use DANE-TA records (for which name checks are in scope)
> 22 have CN-ID and no SAN.  That may be too high a rate to pull the
> plug just yet. :-(

That seems likely; I don't feel a particular need to introduce skew between
reality and the text of the specification.  I guess, if the WG wants, we
could recommend SRV-ID but still allow CN-ID (but this really is up to the
WG and it is not part of a Discuss point given the 7672 precedent).

-Ben

> One notable example is the state of Bavaria:
> 
>   bayern.de. IN MX 10 mail.bayern.de. ; NoError AD=1
>   _25._tcp.mail.bayern.de. IN TLSA 2 0 1 32a2bc1d515cdbc412b62b47a1cccf2bb1b8e3ef309f982458d3a7c61797422a ; NoError AD=1
>       cert sha256 [matched] <- 2 0 1 32a2bc1d515cdbc412b62b47a1cccf2bb1b8e3ef309f982458d3a7c61797422a
>       cert sha256 [matched] <- 2 0 1 32a2bc1d515cdbc412b62b47a1cccf2bb1b8e3ef309f982458d3a7c61797422a
> 
> which sports a V1 cert (no extensions, hence no SANs).  The issuer
> looks like a private CA:
> 
>   C = DE
>   ST = Bayern
>   O = Freistaat Bayern
>   CN = Bayerische DANE-CA
> 
> -- 
> 	Viktor.
>