Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS
Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> Tue, 13 September 2011 12:42 UTC
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Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2011 08:45:10 -0400
From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
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To: Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com>
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Cc: Chris Evans <cevans@google.com>, websec@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS
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Thanks for publishing this spec, Chrises! On 09/12/2011 05:56 PM, Chris Palmer wrote: > (Sites can pin to one or more public keys in end entity, subordinate > CA, and/or root CA certificates, for flexibility and disaster > recovery.) I think more discussion about the relative consequences of pinning EE vs. intermediate CA vs. root CA certs would be useful. From my perspective, i see no advantage to pinning any of the CAs -- if your EE is compromised, you're sunk. And since the mechanism provides a mechanism (and nice instructions, thanks) for transition to an emergency offline backup EE key+cert, that is all handled well. What advantage would a site gain from pinning to an intermediate or root CA? It seems that all this would do is expose the site operators to (limited, thankfully) extortion from the CA in question. The only situation where i can see it being useful is to ease deployment in a situation where the operating organization operates their own CA. If this is the only circumstance where it is advisable to pin a CA cert instead of an EE cert, that should probably be added to the documentation explicitly. Or is there some other circumstance that it would be actually useful that i'm missing? --dkg
- [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Chris Palmer
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Richard L. Barnes
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS SM
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS =JeffH
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Richard L. Barnes
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Marsh Ray
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Yoav Nir
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Adam Langley
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS James Nicoll
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Adam Langley
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Tobias Gondrom
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Tom Ritter
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Philip Gladstone
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Chris Palmer
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Chris Palmer
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Chris Palmer
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [websec] Certificate Pinning via HSTS Phillip Hallam-Baker