Re: [websec] HPKP & different encodings of the same public key

Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com> Sun, 15 May 2016 19:54 UTC

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To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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From: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Sun, 15 May 2016 22:54:43 +0300
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Subject: Re: [websec] HPKP & different encodings of the same public key
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>> On 15/05/16 10:22, Yoav Nir wrote:
>>> That’s interesting. With HPKP you can pin keys from existing certificates, or keys that are not (yet) in certificates.
>>>
>>> One of the early deployment scenarios (which got de-emphasized later on) was that you include two pins: your current production key and a spare key that you will certify if something bad happens to the production key (like the private key leaking out).
>>>
>>>
>> Hi Yoav,
>>
>> I had assumed this *is* the main deployment scenario. If it was de-emphasized, what do you consider as the "classic" HPKP usage scenario?
>
> Current certificate plus some CA certificate that you are likely to use to certify your next certificate.
>
> Yoav
>

But this too means that you're guessing how the CA will behave in the 
future. If your current cert is expiring in a month and you generate the 
new one, you can be surprised by the CA using a new intermediate cert.

And of course, some people would never pin to a CA cert. To me, the 
whole idea of certificate pinning is to reduce the need to trust the PKI 
industry, and that includes my own friendly CA.

Thanks,
	Yaron