[WIMSE] Re: Follow-up of meeting 122 presentation (Formal proof of insecurity of Intel's RA-TLS and draft-fossati-tls-attestation)

Yaroslav Rosomakho <yrosomakho@zscaler.com> Sun, 28 December 2025 16:12 UTC

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From: Yaroslav Rosomakho <yrosomakho@zscaler.com>
Date: Sun, 28 Dec 2025 16:12:31 +0000
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Subject: [WIMSE] Re: Follow-up of meeting 122 presentation (Formal proof of insecurity of Intel's RA-TLS and draft-fossati-tls-attestation)
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// Speaking as WIMSE Architecture draft co-author.

I don't believe WIMSE architecture proposes or implies a specific mechanism
to deliver attestation. And I don't think this detail needs to be covered
in this reasonably high-level informational document.

Can you please explain in more detail why specifically you are "strongly
opposed" to draft-ietf-wimse-arch-06?

Best Regards,
Yaroslav

On Sun, Dec 28, 2025 at 10:40 AM Muhammad Usama Sardar <
muhammad_usama.sardar@tu-dresden.de> wrote:

> Hi,
>
> # *TL;DR*
>
> I am strongly opposed to any WIMSE draft (including
> draft-ietf-wimse-arch-06 and draft-lkspa-wimse-verifiable-geo-fence) which
> proposes or even implies attested TLS in pre-handshake or intra-handshake
> attestation.
>
>
> # *Details*
>
> I would like to follow up on my presentation at meeting 122 on the
> identity crisis [0], and the several mailing list discussions for
> draft-lkspa-wimse-verifiable-geo-fence.
>
> In our paper [1] (accepted at AsiaCCS), we (i.e., I, Mariam Moustafa and
> Tuomas Aura) provide a formal proof of insecurity of pre-handshake
> attestation (Intel's/Interoperable RA-TLS) as well as intra-handshake
> attestation (draft-fossati-tls-attestation). Formal proof is available at
> [2] under Apache-2.0 license.
>
> We would like to have your review and feedback on the pre-print [1] and
> proof [2]. If there is any objection/disagreement, please speak up, else
> please clean up your drafts.
>
> Based on follow-up research, we believe that it is not possible to make
> pre-/intra-handshake attestation secure in the general case, and that
> post-handshake attestation is the most secure solution.
>
> -Usama
>
>
> [0]
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/122/materials/slides-122-wimse-identity-crisis-00
>
> [1]
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/398839141_Identity_Crisis_in_Confidential_Computing_Formal_Analysis_of_Attested_TLS
>
> [2] https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/formal-spec-id-crisis
>
>
> PS: Please keep me explicitly in To/CC. I am currently overwhelmed with
> SEAT work and currently not following this list.
> --
> WIMSE mailing list -- wimse@ietf.org
> To unsubscribe send an email to wimse-leave@ietf.org
>

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