Re: [6lo] FW: I-D Action: draft-ietf-6lo-plc-03.txt

["Liubing (Remy)" <[e-mail]>]

Hello Michael,

Is the following understanding correct? The difference between the "one-touch" and the "zero-touch" methods is that whether the key or certificate is provisioned by the manufacturer or by the operator at the deployment site. As long as the key/IDevID/certificate is provisioned before the device goes out of the factory, i.e., the operator doesn't have to provision/touch it on site to get it securely join the network, it can be considered as "zero-touch".

Even though the pledge ID is given privately by the manufacturer, and not as per 802.1 AR, the dtsecurity-zerotouch-join method can be implemented by using the MASA provided by the manufacturer? Is the dtsecurity-zerotouch-join method aimed at a scenario in which a certificate can't be provisioned a priori?

Many thanks.

Remy

-----邮件原件-----
发件人: Michael Richardson [mailto:[e-mail]] 
发送时间: 2020年5月20日 23:10
收件人: Liubing (Remy) <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]; Carles Gomez Montenegro <[e-mail]>
主题: Re: 答复: [6lo] FW: I-D Action: draft-ietf-6lo-plc-03.txt


Liubing (Remy) <[e-mail]> wrote:
    > Thank you for mentioning 6tisch-minimal-security.  There is also a
    > BRSKI-like 6tisch mechanism that uses IDevID.

    >   [Remy] I think you must
    > be talking about [draft-ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join]. The
    > minimal security is considered to be one-touch since the PSK has to be
    > configured a priori. And this document provides a zero-touch method, in
    > which the IDevID (provided by the manufacturer) in 802.1AR is used as
    > the credential for authentication. The authentication is done with the
    > help of the MASA. Am I understanding it correctly? I think the method
    > simplifies the provisioning procedure. However, the PLC standards have
    > not supported 802.1AR yet, thus this zero-touch method couldn't be used
    > in the implementation at this moment.

Whether or not the *PLC* documents specify 802.1AR is not really relevant.
They also don't specify any useful secure join mechanism at all.

The device either has a manufacturer provided keypair, or it has to be provisioned with a key by the operator.

    > Is it the case that the PLC devices can have no L2 security as an
    > option?  I believe that you may wish to outlaw that situation.

    > [Remy] All the PLC standards we mentioned in this document have L2
    > security mechanisms, such as encryption, data integrity, and
    > anti-replay. Since this document is focused on the adaptation layer and
    > above, the L2 security is considered to be applied by default.

Then uou can use dtsecurity-zerotouch-join or 6tisch-minimal-security.

--
Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>, Sandelman Software Works  -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-