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Re: [6tisch] Intelligent JP / validating the MASA

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Thu, 22 August 2019 23:49 UTC

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Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2019 18:49:16 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Cc: "Pascal Thubert (pthubert)" <pthubert@cisco.com>, =?utf-8?B?TWFsacWhYSBWdcSNaW5pxIc=?= <malisa.vucinic@inria.fr>, Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>, "6tisch@ietf.org" <6tisch@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [6tisch] Intelligent JP / validating the MASA
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On Thu, Aug 22, 2019 at 05:00:39PM -0400, Michael Richardson wrote:
> 
> Pascal Thubert (pthubert) <pthubert@cisco.com> wrote:
>     > I’m reading a question of possibility multiple JRC whereby the pledge
>     > would indicate which JRC to use and possibly leverage that for an
>     > attack on anyone outside.
> 
> No, the pledge intentionally has no way to signal alternate destinations.

Cool; I think I had missed that or confused myself.
Combined with the defenses in minimal-security that Mališa pointed out, it
sounds like we're in pretty good shape.  Now Pascal just has to figure out
how to point to the text in minimal-security without bloating -architecture
too much!

Thanks,

Ben

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