Re: [Ace] Stephen Farrell's Yes on draft-ietf-ace-usecases-09: (with COMMENT)

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Fri, 23 October 2015 08:24 UTC

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To: Ludwig Seitz <ludwig@sics.se>
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [Ace] Stephen Farrell's Yes on draft-ietf-ace-usecases-09: (with COMMENT)
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Hiya,

On 23/10/15 09:04, Ludwig Seitz wrote:
> On 2015-10-22 15:29, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> [...]
>>
>> 1. Software update is really needed and often missing and
>> usually hard. There's at least a need to authenticate and
>> authorize new firmware, when there is any update. That may not
>> be the same as authorizing a new config.
>>
>> 2. Alice buys a new device, and would like to know if it is
>> calling home or what it is doing before she configures it, or
>> perhaps before she accepts it in her network. Even if she
>> accepts it, she may want to be able to monitor the data it
>> is sending "home" e.g. to ensure her TV is not sending
>> data when she inserts a USB stick, if that is undesired.
>>
>> 3. Device fingerprinting is a threat that ought be considered
>> by solution developers, especially if there is no reliable
>> software update. Probably the best to be done is to try to
>> make it hard for unauthorized parties to fingerprint a device,
>> but that's also hard.
>>
>> 4. Commercial Devices will be end-of-lifed by vendors, and yet
>> Alice still needs to be able to use, and perhaos to update,
>> the device. That calls for some kind of authorization handover
>> which is not quite the same as a change of ownership.
>>
>> 5. Penetration testing will happen and devices should not barf
>> even then. Maybe that's a security consideration worth a
>> mention.
>>
>> See also the secdir review. [1] It'd be good to see a
>> response to that.
>>
>>     [1]
>> https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg06101.html
>>
> 
> Hi Stephen,
> 
> Thank you for your comments!
> 
> We are making final adjustments to the document based on the *-DIR and
> the ballot comments.
> 
> In the light of the discussion of your comments, Steffi and I are
> leaning towards not including them in this draft, since they are of a
> more general nature and would fit better in a general IoT/CoRE security
> document.
> 
> Would that be ok with you?

That is ok, but I disagree of course:-)

I do think there are ace-specific use-cases arising from
the above. But I can fully understand not wanting to take
on such additions at this stage as well.

S

> 
> 
> /Ludwig
> 
> 
>