[Ace] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-gerdes-ace-dtls-authorize-01.txt

Olaf Bergmann <bergmann@tzi.org> Mon, 13 March 2017 10:12 UTC

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From: Olaf Bergmann <bergmann@tzi.org>
To: ace@ietf.org
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 11:12:27 +0100
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Subject: [Ace] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-gerdes-ace-dtls-authorize-01.txt
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Hi all,

we have submitted a new version of the coap-dtls profile draft for
ACE. Besides some minor editorial changes it contains new text that
resolves an inconsistency in the dynamic update for the PSK case.

Best regards
Olaf

--- Begin Message ---
A new version of I-D, draft-gerdes-ace-dtls-authorize-01.txt
has been successfully submitted by Olaf Bergmann and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-gerdes-ace-dtls-authorize
Revision:	01
Title:		Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Profile for Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE)
Document date:	2017-03-13
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		17
URL:            https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-gerdes-ace-dtls-authorize-01.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gerdes-ace-dtls-authorize/
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-gerdes-ace-dtls-authorize-01
Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-gerdes-ace-dtls-authorize-01

Abstract:
   This specification defines a profile for delegating client
   authentication and authorization in a constrained environment by
   establishing a Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) channel
   between resource-constrained nodes.  The protocol relies on DTLS for
   communication security between entities in a constrained network.  A
   resource-constrained node can use this protocol to delegate
   management of authorization information to a trusted host with less
   severe limitations regarding processing power and memory.

                                                                                  


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--- End Message ---