Re: [Acme] [Errata Held for Document Update] RFC8555 (6843)

Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> Mon, 15 January 2024 05:54 UTC

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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2024 21:54:13 -0800
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To: Aaron Gable <aaron@letsencrypt.org>
Cc: Deb Cooley <debcooley1@gmail.com>, IETF ACME <acme@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Acme] [Errata Held for Document Update] RFC8555 (6843)
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On Sun, Jan 14, 2024 at 9:12 PM Aaron Gable <aaron@letsencrypt.org> wrote:

> On Sun, Jan 14, 2024, 10:12 Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Jan 14, 2024 at 3:01 AM Deb Cooley <debcooley1@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> I had this marked as 'hold for update' (vs. 'verified').  I can't tell
>>> from the discussion how you think we should be handling it.
>>>
>>
>> The erratum says "the challenge must be initiated over HTTP, not HTTPS.",
>> which is a little better than the current draft, in my opinion.
>>
>
> To be clear, the document being discussed is not a draft, it's a full RFC
> which was finalized five years ago.
>

That's twice now. Just stop with this stuff. Do you seriously think I don't
understand IETF procedures?

While you're correct that HSTS preload lists (there are multiple) are not
> just for browsers, they are just for the applications and platforms that
> maintain them. ACME clients do not generally run on such platforms, they
> usually run on server operating systems. They are under no obligation to
> use any HSTS preload list (which are not part of the HSTS spec), if there
> even was an obvious list for them to use.
>

Your protocol is insecure.

thanks,
Rob