[Acme] Re: Comment on draft-ietf-acme-profiles about change management
Mike Ounsworth <ounsworth+ietf@gmail.com> Mon, 12 January 2026 00:29 UTC
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From: Mike Ounsworth <ounsworth+ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2026 18:29:27 -0600
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To: Aaron Gable <aaron@letsencrypt.org>
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CC: draft-ietf-acme-profiles@ietf.org, IETF ACME <acme@ietf.org>
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Subject: [Acme] Re: Comment on draft-ietf-acme-profiles about change management
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Hmm. ok. PS I didn't "length of the validation chain" as in "whether or not the CA servers the intermediate", I meant, like, the CA actually physically adds or removes a layer of CA. I think I'm thinking that the PQ era will involve changes larger than the changes we've seen over the past decade, but I'm also ok to leave it. On Fri, 9 Jan 2026 at 17:03, Aaron Gable <aaron@letsencrypt.org> wrote: > Hi Mike, > > Responding to pull-quotes inline below: > > On Thu, Jan 8, 2026 at 4:36 PM Mike Ounsworth <ounsworth+ietf@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> I think there's an assumption here that the CA is free to evolve their >> offered profiles over time; >> > > Yes, they are, and they always have been: every ACME CA for the last > decade has been evolving their single default profile over time to keep up > with changing requirements and best practices. > > >> But then, how much change is too much change that the CA really ought to >> declare a new profile and deprecate the old one? >> > > That's a very, very high bar. Note that the draft says that requests for > an unrecognized profile MUST be rejected by the CA. This means that fully > deprecating a profile breaks all clients which are explicitly requesting > that profile, until their operators notice and update their profile > configuration. > > This is on purpose. We believe that if a client is requesting a specific > profile, it is probably doing so for good reason (especially given that all > ACME clients have gotten along just fine with only a single default profile > for the last decade). It would be surprising for a client to request > profile `foo` and instead get an order with profile `bar` because the CA > has deprecated `foo`. > > But this also means that CAs should generally not design profiles with the > intent to deprecate them. In turn, "versioning" profiles will cause site > operators to have to update their requested profile configuration > frequently, and/or require the CA to support many ancient version numbers > lest they risk breaking anyone requesting that specific version. > > I think that any mention of versioning (whether normative or merely a > suggestion) within this draft will lead both CAs and clients to believe > that profiles are meant to be immutable, and that way lies sadness. If > there is to be any discussion of versioning within this document, I would > want it to be an exhortation against versioning, as it breaks the > longstanding contract of "trust the CA to make the best decision possible > given the current regulatory environment". > > Thanks, > Aaron > > P.S.: > > >> if you changed the length of the CA cert path, >> > > Note that, in ACME, the length of the validation chain shouldn't be > influenced by the profile; that's instead controlled post hoc via link > rel=alternate headers on the certificate download. >
- [Acme] Comment on draft-ietf-acme-profiles about … Mike Ounsworth
- [Acme] Re: Comment on draft-ietf-acme-profiles ab… Aaron Gable
- [Acme] Re: Comment on draft-ietf-acme-profiles ab… Mike Ounsworth
- [Acme] Re: Comment on draft-ietf-acme-profiles ab… Aaron Gable
- [Acme] Re: Comment on draft-ietf-acme-profiles ab… Mike Ounsworth
- [Acme] Re: Comment on draft-ietf-acme-profiles ab… Bob Beck