Re: [Acme] [SUSPICIOUS] Use cases / trust model for device certs

Hi Richard,

Just to add, ACME is really an enrollment protocol.  For device onboarding, we have those.  I hadn’t really thought about ACME as one, but there are definitely some concepts that can and should be leverage.  PoP or Proof of ownership is one that requires exploration.  Also, this ties to supply chain management/SBoM, and the work of SUIT.  Specifically, how does the onboarded identity relate to the application?

There is a mailing list for this: iot-onboarding@ietf.org <mailto:iot-onboarding@ietf.org>.

Eliot

> On 17 Apr 2019, at 10:09, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
> 
> Hey Rifaat,
> 
> Owen and I were chatting about ACME and device certs this morning, and it seemed like it might be useful to rekindle discussion on the topic here on the ACME list.
> 
> I'd like to push a little more on the trust model here.  Just to establish some terminology:
> 
> - Device: Uses certificates to authenticate identifiers
> - Vendor: Makes the device that will get the end certificate
> - Customer: Buys the device from the vendor and operates it
> - CA: Validates identifiers and issues certificates
> - Relying Party: Uses certificates to verify authentication for identifiers
> - Device Identity: MAC address or similar
> 
> In the flows Owen and I have been discussing (more based on ANIMA/BRSKI), the model is basically broken in two, with the customer in the middle:
> 
> 1. The customer validates devices' device identity as part of the ANIMA flow, based on the customer trusting the vendor, and assigns the device a domain name
> 2. The customer uses ACME to issue domain name certificates (the CA is unaware of the device identity)
> 
> That all pretty much just works with BRSKI and ACME as they are today.  But it presumes that the RP is authenticating the device by domain name, as is prevalent in most uses of TLS today.
> 
> In contrast, it seems like your draft presumes that the RP needs to know the device identity; it's not satisfied by a domain name alone.  Can you elaborate a bit more on what scenarios you have in mind for this?  If all you care about is the customer tracking things, then the model above is sufficient; the customer can simply assign domain names that encode the device identity however it likes.
> 
> Thanks,
> --Richard
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Re: [Acme] [SUSPICIOUS] Use cases / trust model for device certs

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