Re: [Acme] ACME signature mechanics

Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net> Thu, 18 December 2014 12:57 UTC

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Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 13:56:59 +0100
From: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>
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To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Acme] ACME signature mechanics
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Hi Phillip,

this statement caught my attention:

On 12/18/2014 01:33 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> Minimal TLS stacks for embedded devices don't typically do client auth.
> See 'minimal'.

It depends what devices you are talking about, for what purpose they use
TLS/DTLS, and what the overall design pattern of the device is.

With the work we are doing in other working groups, such as DICE, we are
trying to give guidance on how to use TLS/DTLS for use with  Internet of
Things (=small embedded devices) in an effort to bring more
(standardized) security protocols into those devices.

With that work we are heavily relying on mutual authentication at the
DTLS/TLS level.

Ciao
Hannes

PS: I also don't think that the discussion on this list is relevant to
embedded devices.