Re: [Acme] Pre-authorization approach

Jacob Hoffman-Andrews <jsha@eff.org> Wed, 10 August 2016 01:09 UTC

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From: Jacob Hoffman-Andrews <jsha@eff.org>
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Date: Tue, 09 Aug 2016 18:09:42 -0700
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Subject: Re: [Acme] Pre-authorization approach
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On 08/09/2016 05:27 PM, Andrew Ayer wrote:
> This means that clients can't rely on the server offering this
> endpoint.  Although there is a risk of half-baked implementations
> assuming all servers support it, it seems unlikely that many would make
> this mistake.  All clients have to go through the new-app workflow
> anyways, and it's easier to just let the server create authorizations for
> you.

I disagree that the risk of half-baked clients. Experience shows that if
something works, some clients will do it, and will break if it's not
available.

This is exacerbated by the fact that the new-authz flow most closely
matches the flow currently implemented in Boulder and used by existing
ACME clients. So the reasonable and safe thing for a client maintainer
to do would be to keep using new-authz if Let's Encrypt continues to
offer it.

I think the only way to make sure the ecosystem of ACME clients is
actually interoperable with servers that don't implement new-authz is
for Let's Encrypt not to implement new-authz in its next API revision.
Which is reasonable, but it means that EKR's issue goes unaddressed.