[Add] Paul Wouters' Discuss on draft-ietf-add-resolver-info-12: (with DISCUSS)

[Paul Wouters via Datatracker <[e-mail]>]

Paul Wouters has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-add-resolver-info-12: Discuss

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DISCUSS:
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In general, I am not sure what this document wants to achieve.

It states:

        DNS clients can use the resolver information to identify the
        capabilities of DNS resolvers.

It then defines qnamein, exterr and infourl. The latter should not be used
by the DNS client. So what should a DNS client do with the information
that QNAME Minimalization is used, or that the DNS resolver code base
supports EDE (but EDE might not be in use anyway). What behavioral
change is expected from "DNS Clients" that are targeted by this document?
If no change in behavior is expected, why should a DNS client support and
perform this query?


Furthermore, none of the answers can be trusted without some form of
enterprise provisioning.

Why inform the resolver is using qname minimalization? What makes this
optional special, compared to other things like 0x20 support, the infra-rr
hardering support, DNSSEC support? Why is it not providing keywords for
DoH or DoT or DoQ support? Why not show what normally would be in the
CHAOS version.bind data like dns implementation name and version?

If the DNS client would behave differently based on the setting of
qnamein, what would it be and how would it determine the security of
the returned value (eg why wouldn't the target DNS resolver just lie to
cause the DNS Client to do whatever behavior it does differently when
it sees qnamein?). If this is meant only for administrators doing DNS
diagnostics, why not ONLY return an infourl and have qnamein and exterr
contained in infourl, or even more keywords based on a DNS yang model
list of keywords?

What is the DNS Client expected to do with the exterr values returned?
What does "supported" mean, eg versus "configured". What different
DNS Client behavior is expected based on this value?

The "infourl" seems a bit risky. While the documents tries to limit
the impact, I don't understand its approach.

Why insist on "https" ? It's a public API that anyone that can query
the nameserver can presumably retrieve anyway? That is, I assume such
a infourl would not require HTTP level authentication. I don't see why
it should be forced over https.

Why is the information presented a text/html and not plaintext ? Or
json? Or yang? This would avoid various risks of exposure to the enduser
which are not meant to consume this anyway according to the document.

        The URL SHOULD be treated only as diagnostic

Why is that not the case for qnamein and exterr?
Why is that not a MUST?

        A DNS client MAY choose to display the URL to the end user

Why is this not a MUST NOT ?

        if and only if the encrypted resolver has sufficient reputation

This is not something an implementer can write code for reading the RFC.
It further more pushes centralization towards "reputable DNS resolvers".
How does the DNS client get updates about the reputable status of a DNS
resolver?

I feel just like "captive portals", that this can/will be misused and be used
for advertisement or other non-DNS purposes. Forcing this to be text/plain
or json/yang would make this "less consumable" to endusers and thus make them
more safe against abuse.

In Section 7 it states:

        1. Establish an authenticated secure connection to the DNS resolver.

        [...]

        It is important to note that, of these two measures, only the
        first one can apply to queries for 'resolver.arpa'

How can anyone establish a secure authenticated connection to
"resolver.arpa"?

If they do, either the client has to authenticate it is the real
"resolver.arpa" but then its contents cannot apply (it's something on
the internet, not local) or it authenticates to "something else", in
which case how can that be secure, or if it is secure but populated with
information that validates "starbucks", how meaningful is "authentication"
in this context?

The section contains another set of "weasel wording" on determining
reputation of the resolver that is not really implementable in code.