Re: [Add] [EXT] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-reddy-add-server-policy-selection-02.txt

[Vittorio Bertola <[e-mail]>]

>     Il 02/06/2020 14:15 tirumal reddy <[e-mail]> ha scritto:
> 
>     Good point, client authentication looks like a relevant use case for Enterprise provided DoH/DoT server to authenticate roaming users. For example, Firefox DoH setting accepts user credentials (network.trr. credentials) to authenticate the user to use the DoH server but I don't see any support client certificate based authentication yet. Anyways, I guess we can assume other DoH/DoT client implementations will also support client authentication in near future. 
> 
>     I don't get the ISP use case, what credentials will be used by the ISP's customers and how will the browser/OS be provisioned to use the credentials ?
> 
The same way as in the enterprise use case. Think of those ISPs that require you to authenticate before using their SMTP server from outside their network.

> 
>         > >         Even more for "policy blocking": there are at least two big categories (blocked by operator policy vs blocked by law); for the former category, there are several different possible policies (parental control, productivity control, audiovisual blocking etc) which could by the way be applied differently to different users; for the latter, you would at least need to know which law (which jurisdiction) is being applied. IMHO just knowing that the resolver does "some filtering" is not very useful; on one hand, all resolvers in most jurisdictions will be required by law/courts to filter at least something, and on the other, should you actually care about this kind of information to determine whether you want to use or not a resolver that you just discovered, you would need to tell what is being filtered at a more detailed level.
> > 
> >     > 
>     I would say this type of blocking access to domains falls under the category of "censorship" contrary to filtering malware/phishing domains.
> 
Well, to some people "policy blocking" seems to be an euphemism for censorship, no matter what gets blocked and why. In HRPC, actually, a draft currently under discussion defines even malware blocking as "censorship". However, the use of more or less loaded terminology is out of scope - the point is rather whether it would be useful for the client to know the policies more in detail or whether a generic "I filter stuff" signal is useful. But again, this depends on the clients.

--

Vittorio Bertola | Head of Policy & Innovation, Open-Xchange
[e-mail] mailto:[e-mail] 
Office @ Via Treviso 12, 10144 Torino, Italy