[Add] Terminology in draft-ietf-add-requirements - "secure" etc

Patrik Fältström <paf@frobbit.se> Thu, 08 July 2021 06:08 UTC

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From: Patrik Fältström <paf@frobbit.se>
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Date: Thu, 08 Jul 2021 08:08:27 +0200
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Subject: [Add] Terminology in draft-ietf-add-requirements - "secure" etc
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In the requirements document, wordings are used like (example from section 4):

> Redirect secure DNS traffic to themselves when
> they would not otherwise handle DNS traffic.

I find it a bit confusing what the wording "secure DNS traffic" implies.

In various scenarios we might have (at least) situations when the traffic between stub and recursive resolver is encrypted or not. And it might be validated on the recursive resolver or not, and it might be possible for the stub resolver to query with DO flag or not.

Or to put it differently, the DNSSEC validation might:

1. Not take place at all
2. Take place in the recursive resolver side
3. Take place in the local client

In case (1) there is not much to do.

In case (2) the client must trust the recursive resolver.

In case (3) the recursive resolver do not have to trust the resolver.

In all cases the transport between client and recursive resolver can of course be encrypted or not.

May I ask for some carefully selected language here so that we do not call all three cases "secure"? Specifically if the only thing we are looking for is encrypted communication between stub and recursive resolver?

And IF we have some flags and negotiation taking place, would it not be a good idea for the client to actually know where validation takes place?

   Patrik