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[Anima] security review issue 11: what if MASA refuses to provide a voucher #88

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Fri, 30 November 2018 02:27 UTC

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Comments: In-reply-to Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> message dated "Thu, 29 Nov 2018 22:36:14 -0000."
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Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2018 02:26:53 -0000
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Subject: [Anima] security review issue 11: what if MASA refuses to provide a voucher #88
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https://github.com/anima-wg/anima-bootstrap/issues/88

> What happens if the MASA refuses to provide a voucher, or provides a wrong
> voucher? Can the MASA be used to restrain commerce with specific countries?
> Is that a feature or a bug?

BRSKI does not eliminate other mechanisms of enrolling devices.
If the vendor eliminates all other ways of enrolling devices, then yes, it
could be used as a restraint.  But, many vendors already restrict which
firmware can be used in which countries, and by which customers.

It's a feature that the MASA can be used to defer theft.
It's a bug that the MASA can be used to prevent resale.
I'd love to resolve the situation, but I don't know how.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-

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