[Asrg] New DKIM canonicalization to avoid broken signatures
Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it> Fri, 30 April 2010 17:32 UTC
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Date: Fri, 30 Apr 2010 19:31:57 +0200
From: Alessandro Vesely <vesely@tana.it>
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Subject: [Asrg] New DKIM canonicalization to avoid broken signatures
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It is well known that DKIM validation is too strong to be of practical use for everyday messages. Signatures break too often. One solution, in Dave's words, is to Merely use l=0 and hash only the From: field or perhaps From: and Date: or perhaps... http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2010q2/013231.html A better solution might be to use a new "mellowed" canonicalization for the body, and never sign MIME headers. The rough idea is to produce a body hash that is invariant under 99.99% retransmissions, but still characterizes the body content somewhat better than l=0. I think Bayesian filtering has brought a good experience with mail tokenization, as a side product that can be leveraged to achieve this task without reinventing the wheel. Poor HTML coding may require extra tweaks, though. We'd need to discuss the details, implement them, and test. Anyone interested? -------- Original Message -------- Date: 30 Apr 2010 12:33:00 -0000 From: John Levine <johnl@iecc.com> To: ietf-dkim@mipassoc.org Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] Broken signatures, was Why mailing lists should strip them In article <4BDA70B5.4090708@tana.it> you write: >On 29/Apr/10 01:12, SM wrote: >> The diversity >> of the email environment is such that you cannot come up with a >> "mellowed" canonicalization to cope with every possible change. > >Yet, it would seem that by, say, hashing just invariants of binary >representations of the first entity, e.g. discarding its white space >and punctuation, one may reach very high percentages of unbroken >retransmission. It sounds like you want to experiment with different canon schemes for DKIM, rather than the two that exist now. Wouldn't that be more appropriate for ASRG? R's, John _______________________________________________ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html
- [Asrg] New DKIM canonicalization to avoid broken … Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] New DKIM canonicalization to avoid bro… Murray S. Kucherawy
- Re: [Asrg] New DKIM canonicalization to avoid bro… Alessandro Vesely
- Re: [Asrg] New DKIM canonicalization to avoid bro… David Nicol
- Re: [Asrg] New DKIM canonicalization to avoid bro… Alessandro Vesely