Re: [atoca] New Version Notification for draft-barnes-atoca-escape-01.txt

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Tue, 11 September 2012 17:01 UTC

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Date: Tue, 11 Sep 2012 10:01:42 -0700
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
To: Art Botterell <acb@incident.com>
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Subject: Re: [atoca] New Version Notification for draft-barnes-atoca-escape-01.txt
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Art,

It is generally accepted wisdom (in the IETF at least) that XML DSig
[RFC3275] is a recipe for interoperability failure.  The primary
reason for this is the dependency on XML canonicalization.

I'd be interested in hearing a different perspective.  I've used the
apache library to implement an enveloped signature and it wasn't
straightforward.  I'm not aware of any other implementation, but it's
been a few years since I last looked.

Of course, it's a different thing to say the mechanism is broken or
unusable rather than "there is no mechanism".  The former statement
requires greater justification.

I'll let Richard explain the token mechanism.  It's an optimization.

--Martin

On 10 September 2012 22:20, Art Botterell <acb@incident.com> wrote:
> Hi Richard -
>
> I'm confused by the claim that CAP "does not provide any security features that would support authentication of alert originators."
>
> Section 3.3.4.1 of the OASIS CAP 1.2 specification says "The <alert> element of a CAP Alert Message MAY have an Enveloped Signature, as described by XML-Signature and Syntax Processing," and makes reference to both <http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmldsig-core-20020212/ > and <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3275.txt>.
>
> Indeed, XMLSIG has been a feature of every CAP version since 1.0.  And if that's not enough, there's also the existing OASIS EDXL-DE wrapper specification.
>
> So while I'm a huge supporter of an end-to-end approach to CAP authentication, on the face of it the ESCAPE draft seems duplicative and somewhat ill-informed.  Also I fear I'm missing the point of the added "alert token" mechanism, other than to add one more maintenance task that nobody is going to want to own.
>
> But possibly you've just leapt ahead too far for me to follow in a single bound.  What am I missing here?
>
> - Art
>
>
> On Sep 10, 2012, at 8:43 PM, Richard Barnes wrote:
>
>> Dear ATOCA,
>>
>> In order to respond to the chairs' call for candidate alert format documents, we have put together a revision of draft-barnes-atoca-escape.  As you may recall from earlier versions, ESCAPE uses S/MIME to wrap a CAP document, in order to add authentication for alert originators (digital signature and "alert token").
>>
>> The changes from -00 are largely to add more explanatory text, and clarify a few things technically. We haven't translated the whole thing to JOSE (yet).  Mostly, our hope is that in reading the new version, you'll be able to envision how these secure alerts can be used to build an overall alerting system.  For example, they highlight some of the things that a discover / metadata protocol might need to provide (e.g., public keys for authorities).
>>
>> Comments very welcome.  There's even a list of open questions at the front!
>>
>> Thanks a lot,
>> --Richard
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sep 10, 2012, at 11:38 PM, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> A new version of I-D, draft-barnes-atoca-escape-01.txt
>>> has been successfully submitted by Richard Barnes and posted to the
>>> IETF repository.
>>>
>>> Filename:     draft-barnes-atoca-escape
>>> Revision:     01
>>> Title:                Encoding of Secure Common Alert Protocol Entities (ESCAPE)
>>> Creation date:        2012-09-11
>>> WG ID:                Individual Submission
>>> Number of pages: 17
>>> URL:             http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-barnes-atoca-escape-01.txt
>>> Status:          http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-barnes-atoca-escape
>>> Htmlized:        http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-barnes-atoca-escape-01
>>> Diff:            http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-barnes-atoca-escape-01
>>>
>>> Abstract:
>>>  Recipients of emergency alerts need to be able to verify that an
>>>  alert they receive was issued by an authorized source.  The Common
>>>  Alerting Protocol (CAP) provides a standard way of encoding alert
>>>  information, but does not provide any security features that would
>>>  support authentication of alert originators.  This document describes
>>>  a security wrapper for Common Alerting Protocol objects to allow
>>>  alerts to be signed by alert originators.
>>>
>>>  Please send feedback to the atoca@ietf.org mailing list.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The IETF Secretariat
>>>
>>
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