Re: [AVT] Comments on draft-perkins-avt-srtp-vbr-audio-02

Koen Vos <koen.vos@skype.net> Mon, 09 November 2009 12:01 UTC

Return-Path: <koen.vos@skype.net>
X-Original-To: avt@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: avt@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 45AF43A6903 for <avt@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 9 Nov 2009 04:01:21 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id UdL-raje-kXr for <avt@core3.amsl.com>; Mon, 9 Nov 2009 04:01:20 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.skype.net (mail.skype.net [212.187.172.39]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D7A913A681A for <avt@ietf.org>; Mon, 9 Nov 2009 04:01:19 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.skype.net (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.skype.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id AFF946062EF3B; Mon, 9 Nov 2009 12:01:45 +0000 (GMT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=relaxed; d=skype.net; h=message-id :date:from:to:cc:subject:references:in-reply-to:mime-version :content-type:content-transfer-encoding; s=mail; bh=2GFYFd53cvT3 1rdIBuFdm3KVY+8=; b=r7QBr0+FW5XY6kehTtwT8NYWgDQ2PoSAb3kuS8kcDYBe tsX9tgdAN31dtM681ogLFjfApi4WpvqR5+QlZ3liLP07gkaKIQ2Ufne2ZrQLnbyf pOZfoBbFDr3SQh+HyLSWdFpSDbTXR1kpCjcOAu+wFVjnnRCbOIxhEiqSM/IWuFI=
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=skype.net; h=message-id:date:from :to:cc:subject:references:in-reply-to:mime-version:content-type: content-transfer-encoding; q=dns; s=mail; b=eAa66BTyYqSE3cndHeKS hqUpzW7yYRSiufHXrgWGO1+FTEdQidy9PByT02rhxuSHx4cOzfildNRIJvSTvJpK /wiZikDfu27vpLHvq1excx4HlQHTK+DI0zmbC/Jdfeg0hCjn+jeHUr5OVj8fQy4c U6+BgtFgne83j3rEA3QAlBA=
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.skype.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id AE4556062EF36; Mon, 9 Nov 2009 12:01:45 +0000 (GMT)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at dub-mail.skype.net
Received: from mail.skype.net ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (dub-mail.skype.net [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Yn45aq94FKiO; Mon, 9 Nov 2009 12:01:36 +0000 (GMT)
Received: by mail.skype.net (Postfix, from userid 33) id 972586062F37F; Mon, 9 Nov 2009 12:01:30 +0000 (GMT)
Received: from softbank218116249033.bbtec.net (softbank218116249033.bbtec.net [218.116.249.33]) by mail.skype.net (Horde Framework) with HTTP; Mon, 09 Nov 2009 04:01:30 -0800
Message-ID: <20091109040130.39044i2acsr1lq56@mail.skype.net>
Date: Mon, 09 Nov 2009 04:01:30 -0800
From: Koen Vos <koen.vos@skype.net>
To: Cullen Jennings <fluffy@cisco.com>
References: <FC232662-1848-4245-993B-84D6BED6A77E@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <FC232662-1848-4245-993B-84D6BED6A77E@cisco.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1"; DelSp="Yes"; format="flowed"
Content-Disposition: inline
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
User-Agent: Internet Messaging Program (IMP) H3 (4.3.4)
Cc: IETF AVT WG <avt@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [AVT] Comments on draft-perkins-avt-srtp-vbr-audio-02
X-BeenThere: avt@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Audio/Video Transport Working Group <avt.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt>
List-Post: <mailto:avt@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 09 Nov 2009 12:01:21 -0000

If the average VAD overhang time is known by an interceptor, then it  
is still possible to estimate the average talk spurt length (and,  
thus, potentially the language). So the overhang statistics themselves  
should be randomly varied from call to call.

It would indeed be good to see more quantitative analysis, e.g. about:
- The size of the information leak
- How fast the leak shrinks by adding overhang
- How this leak compares to other leaks such as call duration and IP  
addresses.
It would make little sense to close a small leak if bigger ones are  
still wide open.

koen.


Quoting Cullen Jennings:
>
> On the advice to overhang the VAD by a random amount, I think I need  
> more advice to implement this. Clearly if I put a random number from  
> 0 to 1 ms this won't work and if I pick a uniformly distributed  
> random number between 0 and 1 day, it will more or less disable VAD.  
> No complaints about the approach to this but I think I need more  
> advice to be able to implement anything useful.
>
> Is there other research that collaborates the spot-me stuff. I sort  
> of wonder about it at times because the implications of it are that  
> the success at picking the language when the system has all the  
> unencrypted RTP, that the would be better than some of the results I  
> see. I'm not saying I don't believe the spot-me stuff - I would just  
> want to look at it much deeper before I decided and I was wondering  
> what others had found. I often see results where the training data  
> was too closely correlated with the the data used for the test  
> results._______________________________________________
> Audio/Video Transport Working Group
> avt@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt
>