[AVTCORE] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-avtcore-cryptex-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
Roman Danyliw via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Tue, 14 June 2022 21:51 UTC
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Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 14:51:04 -0700
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Subject: [AVTCORE] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-avtcore-cryptex-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-avtcore-cryptex-06: Discuss When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/ for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-cryptex/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- DISCUSS: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- I’m having trouble understanding the relationship between this work and SRTP without making assumptions. Section 1.3 notes that there is a design goal to build on top of SRTP and to have simple SRTP interactions. Section 3 also says the design goal is to “reuse the existing SRTP framework.” Finally, Section 6.2 and 6.3 says ”[t]he encryption (or decryption) procedure is identical to that of [RFC3711] except for the Encrypted Portion of the SRTP packet.” I believe the correct read is that “do everything from SRTP unless noted as different here”. However, saying “encryption and description procedures" per Sections 6.2/6.3 doesn’t capture that for me. This leaves open questions about key management, establish and maintaining state for cryptographic contexts, MTI algorithms, etc. The text would benefit from being explicit on what behavior “a=cryptex” behavior reuses from SRTP. I don’t believe that changes any of the expected core mechanics. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Thank you to Rifaat Shekh-Yusef for the SECDIR review. ** Section 6.2. What does the notation “_4*CC_ bytes of the ciphertext …” mean? ** Section 6.2. Implementations can rearrange a packet so that the AAD and plaintext are contiguous by swapping the order of the extension header and the CSRC identifiers, resulting in an intermediate representation of the form shown in Figure 2. Where would this intermediate representation be used? To double check, this would not be put on the wire? ** Section 8. On MTI/optional/default transforms, does this document want to change anything from what was said in RFC3711? -- Should something be said about AES-GCM per RFC7714, especially since it was listed as an example. -- Assuming this document inherits the MTI transforms for SRTP, please explicitly call out the dangers using NULL transform. ** Section 8. Does any subset of the Security Considerations of RFC3711 apply here? ** A.1. Cite AES-CTR per RFC3711. ** A.2. Cite AES-GCM per RFC7714. Nits ** Section 5.1. Typo. There is a markdown typo of “{RFC8285}}” (i.e., single open brace) which is preventing the rendering this reference correctly in the first sentence. ** Section 5.2. Typo. s/the the/the/
- [AVTCORE] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-a… Roman Danyliw via Datatracker
- Re: [AVTCORE] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ie… Sergio Garcia Murillo
- Re: [AVTCORE] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ie… Roman Danyliw