[AVTCORE] [Errata Verified] RFC5764 (4873)

RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Wed, 08 November 2023 08:37 UTC

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Subject: [AVTCORE] [Errata Verified] RFC5764 (4873)
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The following errata report has been verified for RFC5764,
"Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)". 

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid4873

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Status: Verified
Type: Editorial

Reported by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
Date Reported: 2016-11-30
Verified by: Murray Kucherawy (IESG)

Section: 5.1.1

Original Text
-------------
When the mechanism described in this document is in
effect, this is modified so that data written by upper-level protocol
clients of DTLS is assumed to be RTP/RTP and is encrypted using SRTP
rather than the standard TLS record encoding.

Corrected Text
--------------
When the mechanism described in this document is in
effect, this is modified so that data written by upper-level protocol
clients of DTLS is assumed to be RTP/RTCP and is encrypted using SRTP
rather than the standard TLS record encoding.

Notes
-----
Section 5.1 notes that RTP or RTCP can be sent over the channel, so "RTP/RTP" should be "RTP/RTCP".

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RFC5764 (draft-ietf-avt-dtls-srtp-07)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)
Publication Date    : May 2010
Author(s)           : D. McGrew, E. Rescorla
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Audio/Video Transport
Area                : Real-time Applications and Infrastructure
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG