Re: [babel] Éric Vyncke's Discuss on draft-ietf-babel-applicability-07: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Tue, 06 August 2019 05:09 UTC

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Date: Tue, 06 Aug 2019 00:09:18 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: "Eric Vyncke (evyncke)" <evyncke@cisco.com>
Cc: Juliusz Chroboczek <jch@irif.fr>, Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com>, "babel-chairs@ietf.org" <babel-chairs@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-babel-applicability@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-babel-applicability@ietf.org>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, "babel@ietf.org" <babel@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [babel] Éric Vyncke's Discuss on draft-ietf-babel-applicability-07: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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On Mon, Aug 05, 2019 at 01:07:01PM +0000, Eric Vyncke (evyncke) wrote:
> About my DISCUSS, the explanatory text is good but it is 'just an explanation' and not a proven property of Babel. If you remove the 'robust wrt bugs' from the list below the assertation of protocol robustness then I will be satisfied and will remove the DISCUSS. Simply add the text below the enumeration bullets and starts with "Experience gained in implementation interoperation testing shows that ....".
> 
> For the text about security, what about something like:
> "     Babel-HMAC [HMAC] is a simple and easy to implement mechanism that
>        only guarantees authenticity, integrity, and anti-replay of the routing traffic,
>        and only supports symmetric keying with a small number of keys
>        (typically just one or two).  Babel-DTLS [DTLS] is a more complex
>        mechanism, that requires some minor changes to be made to a typical
>        Babel implementation and depends on a DTLS stack being available, but
>        inherits all of the features of DTLS, notably authenticity, integrity,  confidentiality, and the
>        ability to use asymmetric keys.
> "   (unsure about anti-replay of DTLS though)

(see https://weeklyad.target.com/?lnk=dNav_weeklyad -- it's optional,
building off the sequence number.)

-Ben