Re: [BEHAVE] DNS64 validation

"Dan Wing" <dwing@cisco.com> Thu, 30 July 2009 08:38 UTC

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From: Dan Wing <dwing@cisco.com>
To: 'Simon Perreault' <simon.perreault@viagenie.ca>
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Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2009 10:37:55 +0200
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Cc: 'Andrew Sullivan' <ajs@shinkuro.com>, behave@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [BEHAVE] DNS64 validation
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> Dan Wing wrote:
> > I am assuming there is a way for an attacker to cause a 
> > negative AAAA 
> > response to be received by the DNS64.  If we have the DNS64 
> > return an 
> > error (to the DNS client) when the negative AAAA doesn't 
> > validate, the 
> > IPv6-only host cannot establish a connection to the server.
> 
> How is this different from sending an invalid A response?
>
> How is this different from regular DNSSEC in general? In 
> particular, see
> RFC4035 section 4.7 for ways to mitigate this DoS. See also the
> following quote from RFC4033 section 12:
> 
> "DNSSEC does not protect against denial of service attacks."
> 
> DISCLAIMER: I'm not sure I'm right. I'm just asking questions.

I don't know.  What is gained by validating a negative AAAA,
other than exercising DNSSEC?

-d