Re: [bfcpbis] Kathleen Moriarty's No Objection on draft-ietf-bfcpbis-bfcp-websocket-14: (with COMMENT)

["Ram Mohan R (rmohanr)" <[e-mail]>]

Hi Kathleen,

Please see inline 

-----Original Message-----
From: Kathleen Moriarty <[e-mail]>
Date: Thursday, 19 January 2017 at 1:10 AM
To: The IESG <[e-mail]>
Cc: "[e-mail]" <[e-mail]>, "Charles Eckel (eckelcu)" <[e-mail]>, "[e-mail]" <[e-mail]>, "Charles Eckel (eckelcu)" <[e-mail]>, "[e-mail]" <[e-mail]>
Subject: Kathleen Moriarty's No Objection on draft-ietf-bfcpbis-bfcp-websocket-14: (with COMMENT)
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Resent-Date: Thursday, 19 January 2017 at 1:10 AM

    Kathleen Moriarty has entered the following ballot position for
    draft-ietf-bfcpbis-bfcp-websocket-14: No Objection
    
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    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    COMMENT:
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    I agree with Alexey's comment on section 8.  If fallback to HTTP
    authentication happens, the implementer should be aware of the weaknesses
    in HTTP basic [RFC7617] and digest [RFC7616] spelled out in the
    respective security considerations sections.  The HTTPAuth WG put out a
    few experimental RFCs with methods to eliminate some of the weaknesses,
    like HOBA [RFC7486] that gets rid of the need for passwords.  Adding this
    detail would be helpful.
    
<Ram> Does this text looks ok ?

EXISTING:
         If the status code received from the server is not 101,
          the WebSocket client stack handles the response per HTTP
          [RFC7230] procedures, in particular the
          client might perform authentication if it receives 401
          status code.
NEW:
        If the status code received from the server is not 101,
          the WebSocket client stack handles the response per HTTP
          [RFC7230] procedures, in particular the
          client might perform authentication if it receives 401
          status code.  The WebSocket clients are vulnerable to the attacks
         of basic authentication (mentioned in Section 4 of [RFC7617]) and 
        digest authentication (mentioned in Section 5 of [RFC7616]). To overcome
        some of these weakness, the WebSocket clients can use HTTP Origin-Bound Authentication (HOBA)
        mechanism mentioned in [RFC7486].