Re: [bmwg] draft-cerveny-bmwg-ipv6-nd-02

joel jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com> Wed, 20 November 2013 07:13 UTC

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Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2013 23:13:33 -0800
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To: Bill Cerveny <bmwg@wjcerveny.com>, Nalini Elkins <nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com>
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Subject: Re: [bmwg] draft-cerveny-bmwg-ipv6-nd-02
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On 11/18/13, 4:33 AM, Bill Cerveny wrote:
> Hi Nalini,
> 
> See comments below:
> 
> On Nov 14, 2013, at 8:50 AM, Nalini Elkins
> <nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com
> <mailto:nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com>> wrote:
> 
>> Bill,
>>
>> As I commented at the BMWG meeting, IMHO a few things would be quite
>> valuable to benchmark for IPv6.  I do not know if these are in scope
>> of the charter.  We can certainly discuss further, if desired.
>>
>> 1.  The impact of extension headers on performance
>>      There has been quite a bit of discussion in v6ops and 6man about
>> "long" extension headers and ASIC size.  That is, if the header gets
>> too big, then it is routed slowly.   I, for one, would like to see
>> some kind of formal discussion and benchmarking of this.
> 
> See http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5180#section-5.3, "IPv6 Benchmarking
> Methodology", section "Traffic with Extension Headers". There may be
> value in a more in-depth discussion and benchmarking of extension
> headers and its impact on routers / intermediate nodes.

It's a probably mistaken generalization  to assume there's a recourse to
a "slow path". In many platforms it's perfectly reasonable to expect
fast-path or no-path.

>>
>> 2.  Router advertisements:
>>      Much "bad" stuff can be done with Router Advertisements.   See
>> UTube video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TfsfNWHCKK0
>>      I believe he got this from : https://www.thc.org/thc-ipv6/  which
>> also has:
> 
> This was an interesting attack. I had replicated the behavior described
> in the YouTube video with Windows 7 and Windows 8 in VMs using
> flood_router6 in Nov. 2012. Sam Bowne had done a bit of research on this
> issue, including characterizing the behavior on multiple systems as well
> as confirming that Microsoft had mostly fixed the problem with patches
> in 2013.
> 
> A distinction with the flood_router6 Windows attack is that it didn't
> attack routers (intermediate nodes), as far as I know, and the attack
> could "only" be launched from the same "broadcast domain."
> 
> Bill
>>         - parasite6: icmp neighbor solitication/advertisement spoofer, puts you as man-in-the-middle, same
>>  as ARP mitm (and parasite)
>> 	- alive6: an effective alive scanng, which will detect all systems listening to this address
>> 	- dnsdict6: parallized dns ipv6 dictionary bruteforcer
>> 	- fake_router6: announce yourself as a router on the network, with the highest priority
>> 	- redir6: redirect traffic to you intelligently (man-in-the-middle) with a clever icmp6 redirect spoofer
>> 	- toobig6: mtu decreaser with the same intelligence as redir6
>> 	- detect-new-ip6: detect new ip6 devices which join the network, you can run a script to automatically scan these systems etc.
>> 	- dos-new-ip6: detect new ip6 devices and tell them that their chosen IP collides on the network (DOS).
>> 	- trace6: very fast traceroute6 with supports ICMP6 echo request and TCP-SYN
>> 	- flood_router6: flood a target with random router advertisements
>> 	- flood_advertise6: flood a target with random neighbor advertisements
>> 	- exploit6: known ipv6 vulnerabilities to test against a target
>> 	- denial6: a collection of denial-of-service tests againsts a target
>> 	- fuzz_ip6: fuzzer for ipv6
>> 	- implementation6: performs various implementation checks on ipv6
>> 	- implementation6d: listen daemon for implementation6 to check behind a fw
>> 	- fake_mld6: announce yourself in a multicast group of your choice on the net
>> 	- fake_mld26: same but for MLDv2
>> 	- fake_mldrouter6: fake MLD router messages
>> 	- fake_mipv6: steal a mobile IP to yours if IPSEC is not needed for authentication
>> 	- fake_advertiser6: announce yourself on the network
>> 	- smurf6: local smurfer
>> 	- rsmurf6: remote smurfer, known to work only against linux at the moment
>> 	- sendpees6: a tool by willdamn(ad)gmail.com <http://gmail.com>, which generates a neighbor solicitation requests with a lot of CGAs (crypto stuff ;-) to keep the CPU busy. nice.
>>         - thcping6: sends a hand crafted ping6 packet
>>  
>>  
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Nalini Elkins
>> Inside Products, Inc.
>> (831) 659-8360
>> www.insidethestack.com <http://www.insidethestack.com>
>>
>>  
>> _______________________________________________
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>> bmwg@ietf.org <mailto:bmwg@ietf.org>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/bmwg
> 
> 
> 
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