Re: [CDNi] URI Signing Shared Key Question

Kevin Ma <kevin.j.ma.ietf@gmail.com> Fri, 14 January 2022 03:25 UTC

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From: Kevin Ma <kevin.j.ma.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 22:25:25 -0500
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To: Phil Sorber <sorber@apache.org>
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Subject: Re: [CDNi] URI Signing Shared Key Question
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Hi Phil,

  The shared key redistribution problem only applies to DNS redirection?
So we'd essentially be saying DNS redirect needs to use asymmetric keys for
CDNI, but for non-CDNI cases (i.e., only one level of delegation) symmetric
keys are fine?

  (As an individual) That seems reasonable to me.

  I also do not know if that affects any production use cases and would be
interested in hearing from other WG members who have production insights.

thanx!

--  Kevin J. Ma

On Tue, Jan 4, 2022 at 7:43 PM Phil Sorber <sorber@apache.org> wrote:

> I got more pushback on this again, but I also got another suggestion. Not
> sure if I missed this before or not, but I was told by Ben Kaduk that he
> would be OK if we kept the shared key option for the "single-hop" case but
> removed the distributed case and thus removed the shared key distribution.
> Meaning if I just wanted to have someone internal to my company get access
> to the content I could create a shared key version that would validate.
> However, you would not be able to have a dCDN validate with a shared key.
>
> AFAIK, no proprietary implementation really touts that as a feature, but I
> may be way off base, so I wanted to get more feedback. Does this seem like
> a reasonable compromise?
>
> Thanks.
>
> On Wed, Nov 10, 2021 at 10:54 AM Kevin Ma <kevin.j.ma.ietf@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Hi All,
>>
>>   (As an individual) When we first started the draft, all the vendors
>> were using shared keys, so it was natural to have that as a feature to ease
>> migration and improve adoption.  It looks like shared keys are still used
>> in other URI signing schemes today, so I can only assume it is still a
>> desirable feature, even if it is not secure (along with the other known
>> caveats about the security of URI signing in general).  I could go either
>> way on this one.  We're not preventing anyone from using shared keys, but
>> we may reduce adoption if it is not readily apparent how to use them.  It's
>> a similar argument to the client IP question: are users better off with URI
>> signing with a shared key than some other proprietary protocol (not vetted
>> by secdir) that more readily fits their use case?  I would lean toward
>> stronger language about it being not recommended.
>>
>> thanx!
>>
>> --  Kevin J. Ma
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 9, 2021 at 5:39 PM Phil Sorber <sorber@apache.org> wrote:
>>
>>> This is one of three questions that I had after last call feedback. I'd
>>> like to hear any opinions on the matter from the working group. I will be
>>> pointing to this thread for explanation/justification about the changes or
>>> lack thereof to the document. Thanks.
>>>
>>> Do we want to remove text about Shared Key support in favor of a smaller
>>> comment about how it's possible to do for an internal use case, but not
>>> condoned or recommended by the document, or do we want to keep it as is and
>>> cite having niche value and make sure we have strong language about the
>>> dangers of using it?
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> CDNi mailing list
>>> CDNi@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cdni
>>>
>>