[certid] fwd: Re: Second Last Call: draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check (...) to BCP

=JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com> Wed, 08 December 2010 18:01 UTC

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Subject: [certid] fwd: Re: Second Last Call: draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check (...) to BCP
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Subject: Re: Second Last Call: draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check
	(Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service
	Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)
	Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)) to BCP
From: SM <sm@resistor.net>
Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2010 13:36:43 -0800
To: ietf@ietf.org
Cc: Peter Saint-Andre <psaintan@cisco.com>,
	Jeff Hodges <Jeff.Hodges@PayPal.com>

At 04:36 18-11-10, The IESG wrote:
 >The IESG has received a request from an individual submitter to consider
 >the following document:
 >
 >- 'Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service
 >    Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)
 >    Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS) '
 >    <draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check-11.txt> as a BCP
 >
 >The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
 >final comments on this action.  Please send substantive comments to the

In Section 2.2:

     'A "traditional domain name", i.e., a fully-qualified domain name
      or "FQDN" (see [DNS-CONCEPTS]) all of whose labels are "LDH
      labels" as defined in [IDNA-DEFS].'

It would be better to reference RFC 1123 for LDH labels instead of
RFC 5890 unless the authors would like to adopt a terminology that is
specific to IDNA.

In Section 3.1:

    "Unless a profile of this specification allows continued support
     for the wildcard character '*', the fully-qualified DNS domain
     name portion of a presented identifier SHOULD NOT contain the
     wildcard character, whether as the complete left-most label
     within the identifier (following the definition of "label" from
     [DNS], e.g., "*.example.com") or as a fragment thereof (e.g.,
     *oo.example.com, f*o.example.com, or foo*.example.com)."

If the presented identifier is a fully-qualified DNS domain name (I
assume that means FQDN), the left-most label cannot be a wildcard
character according to LDH rules.  I suggest rewriting that as:

     Unless a profile of this specification allows continued support
     for the wildcard character '*', the domain name portion of
     a presented identifier SHOULD NOT contain the wildcard character
     (e.g., "*.example.com") or as a fragment thereof (e.g.,
     *oo.example.com, f*o.example.com, or foo*.example.com).

In Section 4.2.1:

    "The client might need to extract the source domain and service type
     from the input(s) it has received.  The extracted data MUST include
     only information that can be securely parsed out of the inputs (e.g.,
     extracting the fully-qualified DNS domain name from the authority
     component of a URI or extracting the service type from the scheme of
     a URI) or information for which the extraction is performed in a
     manner that is not subject to subversion by network attackers (e.g.,
     pulling the data from a delegated domain that is explicitly
     established via client or system configuration, resolving the data
     via [DNSSEC], or obtaining the data from a third-party domain mapping
     service in which a human user has explicitly placed trust and with
     which the client communicates over a connection that provides both
     mutual authentication and integrity checking)."

I read part of the above as meaning that data can only be extracted
from DNS if the data has been resolved via DNSSEC.  Is that the intent?

Section 4.3 discusses about how to seek a match against the list of
reference identifiers.  I found the thread at
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/certid/current/msg00318.html informative.

In Section 4.4.3:

    "A client employing this specification's rules MAY match the reference
     identifier against a presented identifier whose DNS domain name
     portion contains the wildcard character '*' as part or all of a label
     (following the definition of "label" from [DNS])"

According to the definition of label in RFC 1035, the wildcard
character cannot be part of a label.  I suggest removing the last
part of that sentence.  FWIW, RFC 4592 updates the wildcard
definition in RFC 1034 and uses the term "asterisk label".

Was the comment about the security note (
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/certid/current/msg00427.html )
in Section 4.6.4 addressed?

Regards,
-sm

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