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Re: [CFRG] NSA vs. hybrid

Natanael <natanael.l@gmail.com> Mon, 06 December 2021 17:09 UTC

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From: Natanael <natanael.l@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 06 Dec 2021 18:09:04 +0100
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To: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
Cc: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>, IRTF CFRG <cfrg@irtf.org>
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Subject: Re: [CFRG] NSA vs. hybrid
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Den mån 6 dec. 2021 15:21Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <uri@ll.mit.edu>
skrev:

> > The other point to consider is that the WebPKI only needs signatures and
> there are other,
>
> > simpler ways to achieve PQC hardening.
>
>
>
> I’m not sure I follow.
>
> In my understanding, PQ hardening (especially for signatures) requires
> using PQ algorithms – what other ways are there?
>
>
>
> > We could heavily modify Certificate Transparency for instance.
>
>
>
> How would that help…?
>

This is straying away from the main topic, but there is "quantum annoyance"
as a step in between quantum resistant or quantum weak.

In other words, systems where every session has to be broken individually
even if you have a quantum computer, rather than just breaking one key once
and then reading all sessions.

>

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