[Cfrg] FW: [saag] Revision of "Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols"
"David McGrew (mcgrew)" <mcgrew@cisco.com> Thu, 08 November 2012 15:35 UTC
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From: "David McGrew (mcgrew)" <mcgrew@cisco.com>
To: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: [saag] Revision of "Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols"
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Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2012 15:35:51 +0000
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Subject: [Cfrg] FW: [saag] Revision of "Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols"
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On 11/8/12 7:29 AM, "Paul Hoffman" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote: >Greetings again. Bruce Schneier and I have started an update to RFC 4270, >"Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols". This revision is >meant to deal with new and more devastating attacks on MD5, the fact that >SHA-1 collisions will be financially feasible in the foreseeable future, >and NIST's upcoming SHA-3 announcements. We expect to keep this revision >process open for at least five months because NIST probably won't >finalize the parameters and naming and so on for KECCAK until then; that >is, we won't send this to RFC Editor until SHA-3 is finalized. Please >take a look at > >http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hoffman-schneier-4270bis > >Sean and Stephen have agreed that we should use the SAAG mailing list for >discussing this draft. > >--Paul Hoffman >_______________________________________________ >saag mailing list >saag@ietf.org >https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag
- [Cfrg] FW: [saag] Revision of "Attacks on Cryptog… David McGrew (mcgrew)