[Cfrg] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-01.txt
Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il> Tue, 12 March 2019 04:28 UTC
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From: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 00:27:55 -0400
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Subject: [Cfrg] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-01.txt
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Dear CFRG and chairs, Draft draft-krawczyk-opaque-01 introduces the OPAQUE scheme, an asymmetric (or augmented) password-authenticated key exchange with unique security and functional features. The draft describes OPAQUE's general design and ways to integrate it with several KE schemes, including TLS 1.3. I would like this work to be considered and discussed as a CFRG WG document. In parallel, we submitted draft-sullivan-tls-opaque-00 to the TLS WG with a much more detailed (though initial) specification for integrating OPAQUE into TLS 1.3. Hugo ---------- Forwarded message --------- From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org> Date: Sun, Dec 30, 2018 at 7:00 PM Subject: New Version Notification for draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-01.txt To: Hugo Krawczyk <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il> A new version of I-D, draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-01.txt has been successfully submitted by Hugo Krawczyk and posted to the IETF repository. Name: draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque Revision: 01 Title: The OPAQUE Asymmetric PAKE Protocol Document date: 2018-12-28 Group: Individual Submission Pages: 20 URL: https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-01.txt Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque/ Htmlized: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-01 Htmlized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque Diff: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-01 Abstract: This draft describes the OPAQUE protocol, a secure asymmetric password authenticated key exchange (aPAKE) that supports mutual authentication in a client-server setting without any reliance on PKI. OPAQUE is the first PKI-free aPAKE to accommodate secret salt and therefore it is the first to be secure against pre-computation attacks upon server compromise. In contrast, prior aPAKE protocols did not use salt and if they did, the salt was transmitted in the clear from server to user allowing for the building of targeted pre-computed dictionaries. OPAQUE security has been proven by Jarecki et al. (Eurocrypt 2018) in a strong and universally composable formal model of aPAKE security. In addition, the protocol provides forward secrecy and the ability to hide the password from the server even during password registration. Strong security, good performance and an array of additional features make OPAQUE a natural candidate for practical use and for adoption as a standard. To this end, this draft presents several optimized instantiations of OPAQUE and ways of integrating OPAQUE with TLS. Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. The IETF Secretariat
- [Cfrg] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-kr… Hugo Krawczyk