Re: [Cfrg] Not the same thread -> was Re: Rerun: Elliptic Curves - preferred curves around 256bit work factor (ends on March 3rd)

Michael Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org> Wed, 25 February 2015 20:06 UTC

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From: Michael Hamburg <mike@shiftleft.org>
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Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2015 12:06:14 -0800
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References: <D1133BAF.5C3D2%paul@marvell.com> <54EE0D4D.2080009@shiftleft.org> <20150225195756.GA12823@LK-Perkele-VII>
To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilari.liusvaara@elisanet.fi>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Not the same thread -> was Re: Rerun: Elliptic Curves - preferred curves around 256bit work factor (ends on March 3rd)
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> On Feb 25, 2015, at 11:57 AM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilari.liusvaara@elisanet.fi> wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Feb 25, 2015 at 09:58:37AM -0800, Mike Hamburg wrote:
>> Thanks, Paul.
>> 
>> On 3.6GHz Haswell with OpenSSL 1.0.1f:
>> RSA-2048: sign 1028us, verify 31us
>> Ed448: sign 51us, verify 163us, dh 148us
>> Ed480: sign 55us, verify 183us, dh 170us
>> E-521: sign 79us, verify 256us, dh 241us
>> 
>> On 1GHz Cortex A8 with OpenSSL 1.0.1f:
>> RSA-2048: sign 39.8ms, verify 1.2ms
>> Ed448: sign 0.7ms, verify 1.9ms, dh 1.9ms
> 
> What is DH (Diffie-Hellman) in that?
> 
> Compressed edwards scalarmult? Uncompressed Edwards scalarmult?
> Montgomery ladder? Does it include key generation time (for not
> reusing keys)?
> 
> 
> -Ilari


Montgomery ladder scalarmult with a few cheap bells and whistles: unified point compression which includes a correctly computed sign, rejecting points on the twist, and hashing the output with the input public keys to make a session key.

It doesn’t include key generation time.  Key generation takes about as long as signing.

— Mike