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Re: [Cfrg] pkcs#1v1.5

Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de> Mon, 24 March 2014 14:09 UTC

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Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2014 15:09:11 +0100
From: Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] pkcs#1v1.5
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On Mon, 24 Mar 2014 15:00:29 +0100
Johannes Merkle <johannes.merkle@secunet.com> wrote:

> Clearly the issue with PKCS#1v1.5 encryption is worse, so there might
> be more urge to migrate to OAEP. As development of TLS 1.3 is just
> about to start, this might be the right time.

Discussion tends to go in the direction that TLS 1.3 may only support
Forward Secrecy cipher suites (which is imho a good thing).
If I understand the working of TLS correctly in that case
OAEP/encryption is irrelevant and we probably only have PSS/Signatures.

(and I very much support the call for PSS - while it doesn't fix
anything severe, it's much harder to mess things up with PSS)

-- 
Hanno Böck
http://hboeck.de/

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