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Re: [Cfrg] [Ext] Re: Analysis of ipcrypt?

Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org> Sat, 24 February 2018 16:00 UTC

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From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org>
To: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
CC: "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Cfrg] [Ext] Re: Analysis of ipcrypt?
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Date: Sat, 24 Feb 2018 16:00:53 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] [Ext] Re: Analysis of ipcrypt?
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On Feb 24, 2018, at 7:42 AM, Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> A “non-invertible” construction based on truncated AES will yield many collisions if format-preserving (hashing to a 32-bit space), and it’ll likely become partially invertible with sufficiently many known in-out pairs.

OK, then apologize for my ignorance. In truncate32(AES128(padded_32_bit_address, 128_bit_random_key)), are you saying that an attacker with lots of pairs can determine the key faster than if it was just AES128(padded_32_bit_address, 128_bit_random_key)?

--Paul Hoffman

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