Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03
Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> Fri, 08 December 2023 17:02 UTC
Return-Path: <dharkins@lounge.org>
X-Original-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EDD56C48EDED for <cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 8 Dec 2023 09:02:30 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.996
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.996 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, NICE_REPLY_A=-0.091, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE=-0.01, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001, URIBL_DBL_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, URIBL_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([50.223.129.194]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ptZNPp7mVH19 for <cfrg@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 8 Dec 2023 09:02:26 -0800 (PST)
Received: from www.goatley.com (www.goatley.com [198.137.202.94]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AA0D5C48EDEE for <cfrg@irtf.org>; Fri, 8 Dec 2023 09:02:26 -0800 (PST)
Received: from kitty.bergandi.net (076-176-014-122.res.spectrum.com [76.176.14.122]) by wwwlocal.goatley.com (PMDF V6.8 #2433) with ESMTP id <0S5C001R3Y028F@wwwlocal.goatley.com> for cfrg@irtf.org; Fri, 08 Dec 2023 12:02:26 -0500 (EST)
Received: from [192.168.1.26] (customer.lsancax1.pop.starlinkisp.net [98.97.61.131]) by kitty.bergandi.net (PMDF V6.8 #2433) with ESMTPSA id <0S5C00NDRY00AY@kitty.bergandi.net> for cfrg@irtf.org; Fri, 08 Dec 2023 09:02:26 -0800 (PST)
Received: from customer.lsancax1.pop.starlinkisp.net ([98.97.61.131] EXTERNAL) (EHLO [192.168.1.26]) with TLS/SSL by kitty.bergandi.net ([10.0.42.19]) (PreciseMail V3.3); Fri, 08 Dec 2023 09:02:26 -0800
Date: Fri, 08 Dec 2023 09:02:24 -0800
From: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
In-reply-to: <CAL02cgRXkKRfa_sHKS0bLz64USpYtmPFM6otmSAVVicOYs0umg@mail.gmail.com>
To: cfrg@irtf.org
Message-id: <913ec76c-ccc3-6b58-26d2-5a246d8ded26@lounge.org>
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Boundary_(ID_Q2/28EGDID1lF6q0MDWCQQ)"
Content-language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/102.14.0
X-PMAS-SPF: SPF check skipped for authenticated session (recv=kitty.bergandi.net, send-ip=98.97.61.131)
X-PMAS-External-Auth: customer.lsancax1.pop.starlinkisp.net [98.97.61.131] (EHLO [192.168.1.26])
References: <4169984b-78cd-4193-b226-1a0297f524b9@isode.com> <66FD05E0-54F6-4651-92DF-773C91CBC651@heapingbits.net> <CAFR824wdxuRfX+pv4AOpMrqRegGEDCdwa+wNetc4kn_s196mfQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAL02cgRXkKRfa_sHKS0bLz64USpYtmPFM6otmSAVVicOYs0umg@mail.gmail.com>
X-PMAS-Software: PreciseMail V3.3 [231204a] (kitty.bergandi.net)
X-PMAS-Allowed: system rule (rule allow header:X-PMAS-External noexists)
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/HkqBFKapLR_kQ2FEyUts-6IQbYc>
Subject: Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03
X-BeenThere: cfrg@irtf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.39
Precedence: list
List-Id: Crypto Forum Research Group <cfrg.irtf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://mailman.irtf.org/mailman/options/cfrg>, <mailto:cfrg-request@irtf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/cfrg/>
List-Post: <mailto:cfrg@irtf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:cfrg-request@irtf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://mailman.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg>, <mailto:cfrg-request@irtf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 08 Dec 2023 17:02:31 -0000
On 12/7/23 2:42 PM, Richard Barnes wrote: > I strongly agree with Chris's analysis here. > > The KEMs are fine. They've already been registered; we should publish > them. > > The new "AEAD"s are not acceptable. The major security claim of RFC > 9180 is that "[HPKE] is IND-CCA2-secure as long as the underlying KEM > and AEAD schemes are IND-CCA2-secure". Right, the key words are "as long as". No one is alleging that the cipher modes added by this draft are IND-CCA2 secure. > The DAE schemes in this draft are not IND-CCA2-secure, so none of the > security analysis that underlies RFC 9180 applies -- all bets are > off. So there are two problems with just plugging DAE into HPKE: No, all bets are not off. Was is affected is: 1. replay of old messages must be handled; and, 2. an attacker would know whether a given plaintext+AAD combination was encrypted twice in a sequence of ciphertexts. SIV has a security proof (in fact, that is one attractive feature because the other deterministic encryption mode-- RFC 5649-- does not have one). It's listed in the draft. Dan. > 1. This new construction would provide substantially different > security properties than HPKE > 2. This draft does not provide supporting analysis for *any* security > properties > > As Chris says, the former problem is reason enough to call a KEM+DAE > something other than "HPKE". The latter problem means that even if > one were OK with the different security properties here, we should not > publish this document because CFRG should not be in the business of > publishing cryptographic constructions without any actual security > analysis. > > As a final note, I would just point out that the even document's > putative justification for DAE is false. It is perfectly possible to > use HPKE in lossy networks. > > --Richard > > > On Thu, Dec 7, 2023 at 5:27 PM Deirdre Connolly > <durumcrustulum@gmail.com> wrote: > > I agree. > > On Thu, Dec 7, 2023, 5:15 PM Christopher Wood > <caw@heapingbits.net> wrote: > > This has been discussed lots of times on the list before. The > current state of the document doesn’t help make this > discussion easy. Basically, there are two things at stake here: > > 1. The new KEMs, for which code points have already been > allocated: https://www.iana.org/assignments/hpke/hpke.xhtml > 2. The new AEADs, which is a point of debate. I won’t > reiterate the argument here and point to my prior issue with > the document: > https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/mP7swra3Mfni5KoPg2NKFccWTOk/ > > That said, I do not think this document should be published in > its current state. Changing the HPKE contract is no small > thing, yet that’s precisely what (2) does, and it does so in > the absence of analysis which says what the properties of HPKE > with DAE (that is, not an IND-CCA2-secure AEAD) are. The > responsible thing to do is to put (2) into a separate > document, for a separate construction that is NOT HPKE, but > something different. > > Best, > Chris > >> On Nov 16, 2023, at 9:42 AM, Alexey Melnikov >> <alexey.melnikov@isode.com> wrote: >> >> Dear CFRG participants, >> >> This message is starting 3 weeks RGLC on >> draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 ("Deterministic Nonce-less Hybrid >> Public Key Encryption"), that will end on December 7th 2023. >> If you've read the document and think that it is ready (or >> not ready) for publication as an RFC, please send >> a message in reply to this email or directly to CFRG chairs >> (cfrg-chairs@ietf.org). If you have detailed comments, these >> would also be very helpful at this point. >> >> Thank you, >> Alexey, for CFRG chairs >> >> _______________________________________________ >> CFRG mailing list >> CFRG@irtf.org >> https://mailman.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg > > _______________________________________________ > CFRG mailing list > CFRG@irtf.org > https://mailman.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg > > _______________________________________________ > CFRG mailing list > CFRG@irtf.org > https://mailman.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg > > > _______________________________________________ > CFRG mailing list > CFRG@irtf.org > https://mailman.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg -- "The object of life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to escape finding oneself in the ranks of the insane." -- Marcus Aurelius
- [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Stephen Farrell
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Dan Harkins
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Stephen Farrell
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Dan Harkins
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Deirdre Connolly
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Richard Barnes
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Martin Thomson
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Stephen Farrell
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Taylor R Campbell
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Dan Harkins
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Orie Steele
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Stephen Farrell
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Dan Harkins
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Dan Harkins
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Dan Harkins
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Dan Harkins
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Richard Barnes
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [CFRG] RGLC on draft-irtf-cfrg-dnhpke-03 Christopher Wood