Re: [CFRG] Google's (current) Threat model for Post-Quantum Cryptography

[Orie Steele <[e-mail]>]

I'd like to point out the hybrid recommendations part:

> Our current recommendation for encryption in transit is to use Kyber768
for key agreement in hybrid with X25519 or P256.
> Our current recommendation is to use either Dilithium3 (FIPS 204, ML-DSA)
in hybrid with ECDSA/EdDSA/RSA, or SPHINCS+ (FIPS 205, SLH-DSA) for this
use case.

I fear how many different variants of these we may see in protocols without
some baseline guidance from CFRG.

I'm resisting the urge to share memes about Marvel villains.

Regards,

OS


On Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 3:25 PM Salz, Rich <rsalz=
[e-mail]> wrote:

> I know Sophie’s on this list, but perhaps modesty held her back from
> posting this link:
>
>
> https://bughunters.google.com/blog/5108747984306176/google-s-threat-model-for-post-quantum-cryptography
>
>
>
>
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-- 


ORIE STEELE
Chief Technology Officer
www.transmute.industries

<https://transmute.industries>