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Re: [Cfrg] draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-00: unsafe to optionally hash A's length

Joachim Strömbergson <Joachim@Strombergson.com> Thu, 14 June 2012 11:25 UTC

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Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2012 13:25:42 +0200
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-00: unsafe to optionally hash A's length
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Aloha!

On 2012-06-13 22:31 , David McGrew wrote:
> I should add that the test cases are all consistent with this change - they all have MIN_LEN_A = 0.

Would it make sense to add a TC for when MIN_LEN!=0?

Yours
JoachimS

-- 
Med vänlig hälsning, Yours

Joachim Strömbergson - Alltid i harmonisk svängning.
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