Re: [CFRG] Pre-draft QSC Key Serialization and Identification

Christine van Vredendaal <cvvrede@gmail.com> Wed, 14 July 2021 08:05 UTC

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From: Christine van Vredendaal <cvvrede@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 2021 10:05:35 +0200
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To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Cc: IRTF CFRG <cfrg@irtf.org>
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Subject: Re: [CFRG] Pre-draft QSC Key Serialization and Identification
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Hi Russ,

Thanks for the feedback on the RFCs, we will look into that.

On the OIDs; I fully agree. We are looking into temporary OIDs, but the
final assignment of permanent OIDs should not leave room for
interpretation. This we should indeed be done after a final NIST Standard.

Cheers,

Christine

Op za 3 jul. 2021 om 17:31 schreef Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>om>:

> You seem to be changing the algorithmIdentifier definition from RFC 5280.
> There is no need to do so.
>
> For each of the OIDs that is assigned, the parameter can be assigned.  If
> the ALGORITHM class definition from RFC 5912 is followed, this should be
> very clear.
>
> On the LAMPS WG mail list, there has been a discussion about when to
> assign OIDs to algorithms.  While some assignments to experiment will be
> very useful, it would be very harmful if the algorithm gets tweaked after
> the assignment of the OID.  For this reason, the final assignment of the
> OID should probably wait for the NIST specification.
>
> Russ
>
>
> On Jul 3, 2021, at 4:51 AM, Christine van Vredendaal <cvvrede@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> Hello all,
>
> We (folks from NXP, IBM and Utimaco) have been working on a draft
> specifying key serializations and OIDs for quantum-safe cryptography to
> already start to prepare for the upcoming new public-key standard.
> We would like to share this with this community for feedback and
> recommendations and also to see if CFRG is the right venue.
>
> At the moment this is a pre-draft in the sense that it is not in an IETF
> format yet, but all the content is there.
> You can find the link to a comment-only Google Docs version here
> <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MbSf7e9NIZ0XCEpJ9Kpdxe04Z5HlvvgOBTUX4uvM1i0/edit?usp=sharing>
> .
>
> The abstract of the document is as follows:
>
> With the NIST standardization effort still in full swing, companies
> implementing post-quantum cryptography now are running into multiple
> issues, such as:
>
>
>    1. Difficulty in managing algorithm versions and the compatibility of
>    associated keys
>    2. Difficulty in interoperability testing
>    3. Difficulty in evaluating the impact of integrating algorithms with
>    higher level standards
>
>
> These difficulties result in delay of many follow-up activities for
> algorithm integration and adoption.
> The document `Quantum Safe Key Identification and Serialization’ specifies
> the key formats of selected quantum safe algorithms, to hopefully resolve
> some of these interoperability issues.
> Additionally it should serve to make choices in future standard clear and
> prevent delays in adaption.
>
> To this end the document contains parameter identifiers for the Round 3
> finalist parameter sets (specific OIDs in some cases to be added), as well
> as key descriptions, byte sizes, and their ASN.1 formatting.
> Open items that we would consider still adding (opinions are welcome) are
> the addition of CBOR formats, and the serialization of signatures and
> ciphertexts.
> We also note that the current OIDs are not useable or filled in yet. We
> are investigating adding temporary OIDs, and in the end permanent OIDs
> should be assigned by NIST upon standardization of a set of algorithms.
>
> *(Current) authors: *Dieter Bong (Utimaco), Joppe Bos (NXP), Silvio
> Dragone (IBM), Basil Hess (IBM), Christopher Meyer (Utimaco), Mike Osborne
> (IBM), Christine van Vredendaal (NXP), Karen Willbrand (Utimaco)
>
> Looking forward to your thoughts and suggestions,
>
> Cheers on behalf of the team,
>
> Christine
>
>
>